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OBODY WILL SAY

it was a quiet term. The total number of cases

decided was again small, only eighty-nine all told. There was
the usual quota of trivia, and maybe a little over; more piddling
points on statutes of limitations, for example, than posterity is ever going
to want to know about.
But there was enough serious national business to make the term
memorable. Every region felt the effects; Hollywood won a slight reprieve
from censorship, while school children and their teachers in New York got
no reprieve at all from school time religious training and loyalty purges,
respectively. Illinoisans were warned to hold their tongues if they would
disparage groups, Oregon discovered that maltreatment by its medical
organizations of experiments in group medicine occurred too long ago to
count, and the South postponed for a year any consideration of its basic
problem of school segregation. In more international perspective, a Japanese-American traitor and military courts in Germany were subjects of
decisions, and aliens within the United States had a murderously bad time
with a series of cases reflecting a renewed chauvinism in legislative policy.
Finally there was the steel case.
The general tone of the term will be suggested by these figures. More
than a quarter of the cases involved civil rights. In twenty civil rights
* This article is the sixth in an annual series. The purposes of the series are (a) to present a

concise summary of the most interesting of the cases; (b) to comment briefly on their apparent
general social significance; and (c) to make some record of factors observed concerning the
institutional functioning of the Court. Shot through each purpose is that sense of personal relief
which an author gets from expressing his own views as to the proper decisions of the cases.
The preceding articles, covering the 1946 through 1950 Terms, are at 15, 16, 17, 18 Univ. Chi.
L. Rev. 1 (1947-50), and 19 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 165 (1951).
t Associate Professor of Law, Yale University.
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cases, the Court divided. In fifteen of the twenty, it decided against the
claimed right.
I. HIGH SPOTS OF TIE YEAR
Dramatic high spot of the year was Youngstown Skeet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, in which the Court and the Constitution were precipitated squarely into the middle of the row between the President and Congress over labor policy. A nationwide steel strike was the most immediate consequence
of the decision, and although for a few days it looked as though settlement
might come easily, that hope soon disappeared and a steel shortage began
to bite into defense production. In the long run the resolution of "the
constitutional question," as it was described in the press, was a marked
step toward restoring the balance of power between the Congress and the
President, a balance which was tipping ever more toward the latter.
Whether Congress would have the wit to make use of its renewed lease on
power was an issue by no means resolved at Term's end.
The law, in Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 2 finally recognized that movies were
out of the nickelodeon stage by extending them some constitutional protection from censorship or, at least, from capricious censorship. Other
major civil rights cases were Zorach v. Clauson,3 which modified markedly
the Court's previous decision on release time and gives constitutional
validity to the New York system of encouraging religious training; Adler
v. Board of Education,4 upholding New York's Feinberg Law, aimed at insulating the teaching profession from disloyal associations; and Beauharnaisv. Illinois,5 upholding conviction of a man who circulated a petition for racial zoning to the Chicago City Council because the petition asserted that Negroes were rapists, marihuana users, and knife carriers. The
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, incidentally, stood on principle and opposed the validity of the state statute in6
volved.
Legislatively, in 1951-52, the United States continued to treat most
lavishly the alien who stayed in his home country (six plus billion dollars
for mutual assistance) and most severely the alien seeking refuge on our
own side of the Statue of Liberty (a new McCarran Act). Judicially, the
Court threw its own set of harpoons into the alien who has come within
our midst. One case in the spirit of most unparalleled severity was Hari1 72 S. Ct. 863 (1952).

2343 U.S. 495 (1952).
4 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
3343 U.S. 306 (1952).
5 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
6 While the NAACP was not a direct party, its General Counsel, Mr. Thurgood Marshall,
signed the petition for rehearing.
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siades v. Shaughnessy,7 which in its extremest instance sanctioned the
deportation of an Italian who had been a Communist for a short time as
a young man, but who had been quite disassociated from such activities
for more than twenty years, and whose association had terminated more
than ten years before Congress made such association a deportable offense. Even more extreme was Carlson v. Landon,8 a decision permitting
the Immigration Service to put suspected aliens in jail and hold them
without bail, apparently indefinitely. This is the closest equivalent to a
lettre de cachet in American history since the Civil War.

II.

REGULATION O:F BusNEss Am-LABOR
Labor
There was one major labor relations problem at the 1951 Term. That
was the Youngstown Steel seizure case. 9
In December, 1951, it became apparent that the steel industry was
headed for labor trouble.10 There had been no contract adjustment for two
years, and the labor contracts were about to expire. Collective bargaining
was unsuccessful, and a strike, potentially disastrous to military output
for the Korean war, for the mutual assistance program, for the national
defense and for domestic consumption, was clearly impending.
In light of a singularly unco-ordinated Congressional labor policy,
President Truman, if he was to act at all, had two basic choices. He could
proceed under the Taft-Hartley Act provision dealing with national emergency strikes," causing a panel to investigate the situation and report to
him and getting an eighty day federal court injunction while the country
and the parties mulled over the report. Sometime in the latter part of the
eighty day period he could, for the umpteenth time in his two terms, ask
7342 U.S. 580 (1952).
8342 U.S. 524 (1952).
72 S. Ct. 863 (1952). The discussion following is a deviation from the usual pattern of this
article in that it expands at some length on the steel case. This course is followed in part
because of the interest and importance of the subject, and in part because there were no other
cases of major economic significance this year. The other labor cases were NLRB v. American
Nat'l Ins. Co., 72 S. Ct. 824 (1952), a decision which may have vast repercussions to collective
bargaining since it appears to permit employers to exclude from discussion so-called "management function clauses," and Int'l Longshoremen's Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 342 U.S. 237
(1952), holding that actions for damages for jurisdictional strikes may be brought under the
Taft-Hartley Act without prior reference to the Labor Board.
10The author was among counsel to the government in the Montgomery Ward seizure
litigation in World War II, and in the discussion following has drawn with freedom on the
brief in that case. He has also drawn at will from his The Future of Presidential Seizure, 46
Fortune, No. 1, at 70 (July, 1952).
- 61 Stat. 152 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 171-80 (Supp., 1951).
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the Congress to do something about emergency strikes, and beyond that,
he was utterly powerless.
The second alternative was to proceed under the Defense Production
Act through the Wage Stabilization Board,' 2 a tripartite body which
might be able to handle the situation through hearings and an award, although the award would have to be accepted voluntarily by the parties.
The President chose this course; the Board recommended a wage increase,
and the only serious remaining issue appeared to be how much of a compensating price increase the government would allow the industry. At that
point, Defense Production Administrator Wilson kicked over the traces
and publicly disapproved the wage recommendation. This led to Mr. Wilson's retirement from his government position, but the break in administration ranks proved fatal as the industry, following Wilson's lead, firmly
resisted the concessions to the union.
As it became apparent that the industry would not accept the Board's
recommendations, a strike again became imminent. And again the President's basic alternatives were two: he could now invoke the Taft-Hartley
Act and win an additional eighty days delay or, so he thought, he could
seize the steel properties, take them into the possession of the government,
and put the Stabilization Board's orders into effect himself. 3
The first alternative seemed to him appallingly unfair. A new investigating panel could only chew over the identical evidence which had just
been before the Board, and the Board's proceedings had already delayed
the strike for ninety-nine days and thus frustrated what had been found
to be the union's just demands for that long. Moreover, one may suspect,
the President had very little sympathy in the Spring of 1952 for using a
statute which had the name "Taft" in it.
The President thereupon chose the seizure device. An appropriate order
was issued, a few flags were run up, and by operation of a remarkable legal
fiction, Secretary of Commerce Sawyer was for the moment czar of the
nation's steel industry.
The industry rushed to court, and the lawsuit proceeded in a welter of
hyperbole on both sides. While the government contended for an unlimited conception of Presidential power and the Solicitor General announced
- 64 Stat. 803 (1950), 50 U.S.C.A. App. §§ 2101-23 (1951).
"3The discussion above omits two lesser alternatives. The requisition provision of the Defense Production Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 799 (1950), 50 U.S.C.A. § 2081 (1951), was unavailable
in part for the practical reason that the President did not have in his official pocket the enormous down-payment required to be made under the statute, and in part because that kind of
payment-in-advance system is singularly inappropriate for a very short term, but indefinite,
taking. The second is the Selective Service Act of 1948, discussed in note 38 infra.
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to an astonished Court of Appeals that an adverse decision would "repeal"
the Emancipation Proclamation and re-establish slavery, the industry
proclaimed that a decision against it would "repeal" Magna Carta. The
trial court gave a preliminary injunction against the government; the
Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia granted a stay; and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari immediately. The case was argued a
week after it came to the Court and was decided in June-three weeks
later.
The issues, though somewhat narrower than whether the principles of
the great Charters of the Anglo-Saxons or of the black race should be undone, were broad enough. Not involved was the question of whether Congress had the power to authorize the seizure of basic industrial properties
to terminate labor disputes; everyone agreed that Congress could do this
as part of its eminent domain power. The question was whether, in the
absence of authorizing Congressional action, (a) the statutes on the books
should be read as by their own force precluding Presidential action, and if
not, (b) whether the President had an eminent domain power of his own
which could be invoked for such an emergency as that then confronting
the United States. Appraisal of the Court's answer required consideration
of the background of executive seizure powers and of the nature of plant
seizure.
(a) Executive power. While the law books commonly announce that the
eminent domain power is purely legislative in origin, there have been important exceptions, for there are executive powers which antedate the
parliamentary system. As long ago as the reign of Elizabeth, persons had
been licensed by the crown to go upon private property to take saltpetre,
and the matter became a subject of litigation before Lord Coke. 14 Saltpetre was used in the manufacture of a newfangled product called gun
powder, "devised within time of memory," said the Court, but already so
valuable as to be essential to "the necessary defence of the realm." The
Court approved the taking because "the ministers of the King ought to
make provision of saltpetre which will endure a long time, and when need
is, to make it into gunpowder, which may be made before the navy can
to put in readiness."
The saltpetre case is so palpably not the steel case that it would be irrelevant but for one thing: it drew the original line, which has lasted with
much deviation since, of emergency as the boundary of the executive taking
power. Lord Coke's court specifically declared that if, instead of saltpetre,
the King desired gravel for the repair of one of his palaces, he could not
14 The Saltpetre Case, 12 Co. Rep. 12, 13 (1607).
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take it; saltpetre was different because its use "extends to the defense of
the whole realm, in which every subject has benefit."
What developed between the middle of the sixteenth and the middle of
the nineteenth century was a theory of emergency executive taking powers which had its ultimate complication in a matter far remote from eminent domain, the doctrine of sovereign immunity. On the one hand, there
were obviously occasions when property "must" be taken. Property in the
path of a fire might be destroyed to stop the fire, and property about to
fall into enemy hands might be destroyed so that it would do the enemy
no good. 15 On the other hand, it is usually unfair to make the individual
bear the whole cost of the common good, and under the doctrine of sovereign immunity there was no way of requiring the community to pay for
what the executive might do.
The result was an emergence, before 1850, by practice and by judicial
decision, of a noncompensable executive taking power for immediate emergencies, principally of war and of fire. During the Revolution and the War
of 1812, property was repeatedly "impressed" when needed for immediate
military purposes. During the Revolution, Rhode Island College was taken over for a hospital, and in 1812 General Jackson took what he needed
for his army at New Orleans. 16 In 1813 the House Committee on Military
Affairs, backing up a General who had seized several boats, said, "In the
circumstances of war, such exigencies will frequently occur in which the
commanding officer will stand justified in taking, by force, such necessaries, either for support or conveyance, as are absolutely indispensable
7
and which cannot be obtained by any other means."'
Those early episodes were never considered by the Supreme Court. The
first case before those Justices arose out of the Mexican War when a
trader named Harmony took a large wagon train from peaceful Independence, Missouri, to the very edge of danger at El Paso, Texas. He
quickly discovered that he had come too close to the front.
Also at El Paso was an American force of 1,000 men, under Colonel
Doniphan, planning to attack Chihuahua, 300 miles away. But Doniphan's force was too small for comfort, and he feared a surprise attack as
he marched. Suddenly inspiration came..Lt. Colonel Mitchell, of Doniphan's staff, seized all the wagons in the vicinity, including Harmony's,
15Leading cases are Respublica v. Sparhawk, 1 Dal. (U.S.) 357 (1788) (war destruction);
Mayor of New York v. Lord, 18 Wend. (N.Y.) 126 (1837) (fire).
16American State Papers (Class IX, Claims) No. 86, p. 197 (1797); No. 584, p: 833 (1822);
No. 590, p. 838 (1822); and numerous others in the same series.
17
Ibid., No. 461, p. 649 (1818).

19521

THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: 1951-52

and pressed all the teamsters into service. Doniphan's force took the
wagons with them to Chihuahua, forming them into corrals at night for the
protection of the soldiers as they slept. Eventually the wagons fell into the
hands of the enemy.
When Harmony got back to safety, he sued Mitchell for the value of
his wagons, asserting that the military had no right to take his property
even in the emergency at El Paso. Therefore, said Harmony, the taking
was a personal theft by Mitchell for which he should have to pay Harmony. The trial court gave judgment for Harmony for $90,000, which
Colonel Mitchell, whose compensation was $187.00 a month, would have
found hard to pay.
Congress promptly passed an Act committing the government to pay
any judgment which the Supreme Court might sustain against Mitchell
and directing the Attorney General to defend the Colonel. The Attorney
General argued that the emergency justified the seizure.
Nonetheless the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment for the trader
Harmony. Chief Justice Taney admitted that there were occasions when
"a military officer, charged with a particular duty, may impress private
property into the public service or take it for public use." But what were
those occasions? Said Taney:
The danger must be immediate and impending; or the necessity urgent for the public
service, such as will not admit to delay, and where the action of the civil authority would
be too late in providing the means which the occasion calls for. It is impossible to define
the particular circumstances of danger or necessity in which this power may be lawfully
exercised. Every case must depend on its own circumstances. It is the emergency that
gives the right, and the emergency must be shown to exist before the taking can be
justified3i
Mitchell v. Harmonymakes verbal sense in its statement of the doctrine
of emergency. It makes practical sense in that the United States got the
wagons, and paid for them by assuming Mitchell's debt, which is fair
enough. It makes no sense at all as an application of its doctrine to its
facts, since it puts the test of "emergency" and then holds that Colonel
Doniphan's situation was not an emergency. Since a more extreme life and
death military emergency would be hard to imagine, one must assume
that the Court made sound law and then twisted its facts because this
was the only way it could reach the just result of letting the United
States foot the bill.
With the establishment of the Court of Claims a few years later, and
the partial waiver of sovereign immunity, the necessity for this disjunction
ISMitchell v. Harmony, 13 How. (U.S.) 115, 133-34 (1852).
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of law and fact passed. From the Civil War to the Twentieth Century, he
verbal test of executive emergency power remained what it was in Mitchell
v. Harmony, but the factual standard perceptibly dropped. A line began
to develop between "extreme emergency" takings which, harking back to
the early fire destruction cases, were noncompensable; and the "minor
emergency" takings, which were considerably less pressing and which
were compensable. Destruction of a toll bridge in the course of the Civil
War by the armed forces, to keep it out of enemy hands, was (a) legal and
(b) noncompensable. 19 The taking of river steamers on the Mississippi,
far from the field of battle, for troop movements was (a) legal and
(b) compensable.2 0 The farthest reach of the doctrine that almost any
executive wartime taking was legal, so long as it was paid for, was a Span21
ish-American War Court of Claims decision, Alexander v. United States.
There the taking of a farm in Pennsylvania for military training purposes
was upheld although the actual hostilities were over and, in any case, had
never been any closer than Cuba.
Meanwhile, as law was developing through decisions, it was also developing through executive practice and Congressional acquiescence. All the
takings mentioned so far were by military subordinates. President Lincoln
himself directed the taking of the railroad and telegraph lines between
Annapolis and Washington.2 2 Senator Ben Wade of Ohio, a leader of the
Republican party, said the Government "may seize upon private property
'23
anywhere, and subject it to the public use by virtue of the Constitution.
Senator Cowan said that when Congress declares war, it gives the President "all the powers necessary to attain the desired end; and among
other things it confers on him power, as has been well said, to impress
horses, railroads, telegraph lines, men, teams, everything of that kind into
24
his service, and compel them to work according to his plan and pattern."
It gives a false sense of precision to summarize this mass of essentially
unco-ordinated practice and decision; but, with due allowance for the
haziness of the sources, it seems to have been generally accepted at the
turn of the twentieth century that there was an executive power, at least
in times of declared war, to take property in case of emergency, so long as
19United States v. Pacific Ry. Co., 120 U.S. 227 (1887).
20 United States v. Russell, 13 Wall. (U.S.) 623 (1871).

2139 Ct. Cl. 383 (1904).
22 2

War of the Rebellion Official Records 603-4 (Series I, 1880).

2"Cong. Globe, 37th Cong. 2d Sess. 509 (1862).

24 Ibid., at 516. For similar statements see Fessenden, ibid., at 512, Browning, ibid., at
510, 520, and Grimes, ibid., at 520.

19521

THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: 1951-52

it was paid for and, in even more extreme emergencies, without paying
for it.
This nonstatutory taking power should be regarded as part of the President's war power. His power in peacetime is something else again. President Theodore Roosevelt gave serious thought to seizing the coal mines to
prevent a coal shortage during the strike of 1902, and probably would have
done so if the strike had not been settled.25 In 1914 the American Federation of Labor asked President Wilson to take over the coal mines of Colorado during a strike.2 6 In 1922, President Harding gave serious consideration to taking such action during a coal strike.27 But the taking power was
not used in any of these instances, and so its exercise in peacetime has
never been tested.
Nor was it tested in World War I. In that War many properties were
taken, but the statutes passed by Congress were broad enough to make
unnecessary the taking of property by the President on his own. There
were those who were confident that he had the power if he needed it. Warren G. Harding, then a Senator, said, "[I]f there were a real war emergency, if there were a present necessity for the seizure of the lines of communication in this country, the Chief Executive would take them over, else
he would be unfaithful to his duties as such Chief Executive.... [I]f the
President believes that there is such an emergency, he ought to seize
them.

25

The real beginnings of large scale takings came with World War 11.29
These were of three types. First were the pre-Pearl Harbor takings by
President Roosevelt for the purpose of settling industrial disputes which
interfered with aid to England and the tooling up for the War. Second
were the seizures between Pearl Harbor and the adoption of the War Labor Disputes Act of 1943, which explicitly gave a statutory base for seizures. Third were the seizures under that Act.
The seizures of the third class are obviously distinguishable from the
steel case because of their statutory base. The seizures of the second class
are distinguishable, if at all, only by the substantial difference that they
occurred in the midst of war which was (a) total and (b) declared. There
were five seizures of this class. The three seizures of the first class (pre2520 Works of Theodore Roosevelt 466 (1926).
"Woodrow Wilson Papers, File VI, Box 393, Nos. 901, 902 (Mss. Div., Lib. Cong.).
27 74 Literary Digest 8-10 (July 29, 1922).
2856 Cong. Rec. 9064 (1918).

29For details, see Appendix No. 2 to justice Frankfurter's opinion in the instant case,
Youngstown Sheet &Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 72 S. Ct. 863, 900 (1952).
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Pearl Harbor) are not, on any substantial basis, distinguishable at all from
the steel case; for just as the steel seizure came during the period of tooling up for conceivable war with Russia, so the 1941 seizure came during
the period of tooling up for World War II If there is any distinction between the two periods, the emergency of 1952 may be more severe than
that of 1941, since in 1952 the United States was already directly engaged
in shooting it out with the enemy.
(b) The nature of seizure.3 ' Seizure, as it has been used, has simultaneously the form of an exertion of the eminent domain power, and the substance of regulation. Theoretically, the government is acquiring property,
as if for a public building; actually it is enforcing a clumsy system of compulsory arbitration. When a plant is seized, not much happens. A few
flags may be run up, a few notices posted declaring that the property has
been taken by the United States. In the steel case, the President signed
Executive Order No. 10340, and Secretary Sawyer, seizing the property,
told a few steel men that they should continue on the job as government
managers.
Typically in seizure cases, the government once in possession quiets the
particular labor trouble which brought it in and otherwise leaves company
administration alone. If the seizure is caused by the employer's refusal to
accept a government wage recommendation, the government usually puts
the recommendation into effect by its own order as "new owner," and
does nothing else. It seemed about to do just this in the steel case but for
restraining court orders. If the government is supporting the employer in
a particular case, as against union demands, it either does nothing at all
or gets an injunction to break a "strike against the government." The
John L. Lewis case, with its $750,000 fine against the union, shows that
seizure is an effective strike-stopping device.
In the general sense of its bearing on the struggles of capital and labor,
seizure is neutral. It is a device for carrying out government "recommendations," and it gets its pro-management or pro-labor flavor only insofar
as the underlying order is pro-management or pro-labor. Management,
labor, and politicians commonly take stands on seizure-in-general instead
30A reader wvill share the sense of pain Justice Jackson must have felt when he attempted
to wriggle out of the fact that the first pre-World War II seizures, that at North American
Aviation, was on his opinion as Attorney General. See his opinion, ibid., at 877 n. 17. It would
have been better if he had stopped with his forthright, "I should not bind present judicial
judgment by earlier partisan advocacy." Ibid.
a Two admirable articles on seizure are Johnson, Administrative Problems of Government
Seizure in Labor Disputes, 11 Pub. Admin. Rev. 189 (1951), and Willcox and Landis, Government Seizure in Labor Disputes, 34 Cornell L.Q. 155 (1948). Many of the facts in the section
following come from them.
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of recognizing that what they are really for or against is the underlying
order in the particular case. In the recent case, one may suspect that
labor-sympathizing Senators Morse and Humphrey and Inland Steel's
Randall took their stands respectively for and against the President's
power on the constitutional question because they were, respectively, for
and against the administration's wage-price proposals for steel. In World
War I, the conservative Harding, then a Senator, was willing to underwrite a seizure power, probably because within the immediate range of his
vision it would be used for anti-labor purposes. After President Roosevelt's pre-Pearl Harbor seizure of North American Aviation, extremely
conservative Dirksen of Illinois approved because the particular seizure
32 operated to hamper Communists in a labor organization.
Of the fifty World War II seizures, about half were used to compel employer compliance and about half to compel employee compliance with
War Labor Board orders. justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion in the
steel case, put it this way:
Today a kindly President uses the seizure power to effect a wage increase and to keep
the steel furnaces in production. Yet tomorrow another President might use the same
power to prevent a wage increase, to curb trade unionists, to regiment labor as oppressively as industry thinks it has been regimented by this seizure."

In one of the paradoxes of democratic government, the main strength of
seizure as a device for settling labor disputes is its very cumbersomeness,
its legal mysto-magic, its flummery. Simplicity is not always a prime virtue in a democracy. In terms of the immediate objective of settling a labor
dispute, seizure is certainly a roundabout way of getting to its ends. If
simplicity were the only value, a far simpler device in a dispute over
wages would be an administrative hearing followed by an enforceable
order deciding what wages were to be.
Seizure required some form or pretense of an actual taking, a structure
of government control, and endless accounting for all the incidents of the
period of government "management."
Because seizure is basically a masquerade, a pretense of government
control, it may even require costumes and fancy titles. In one of the railroad seizures, the railroad managers were put into uniform, turned into
colonels, and eventually became entitled to retired officers pay because
they continued to do the identical jobs they had done before.
The hocus-pocus helps give seizure the value which has made it the
most useful device yet worked out for settling labor disputes in emergen3 87 Cong. Rec. 5974 (1943).
83Youngstown Sheet &Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 72 S. Ct. 863, 888 (1952).
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cies. Its very fanciness, its unusual associations, make it look like less of a
menace to free collective bargaining in peacetime. And if the terms of the
seizure are not so pleasant for either side that it becomes willing to put up
with seizure indefinitely, seizure will stimulate collective bargaining.
(c) The decision. The Court invalidated the taking, 6 to 3, with seven
different opinions covering 133 pages. All that was absolutely clear as a
result was that this particular seizure was invalid.
The "opinion of the Court," delivered by Justice Black, was concurred
in by Justices Frankfurter, Douglas, Jackson, and Burton. Justice Clark,
voting to invalidate, did so on separate grounds. Each of the Justices who
joined Black's opinion also filed a separate opinion, and on separate
grounds; and it is obvious from the diversity of their views that the Black
opinion is at least a diplomatic triumph. As Justice Jackson said from the
Bench, as a preface to his own opinion, "Justice Black's opinion is the
least common denominator on which five of us can agree."
The "least common denominator" is pointedly and necessarily concise,
leaving many questions unanswered. The discussion of the constitutional
question is in six paragraphs, less than three pages. 34 The power of the
Commander-in-Chief is not adequate "to take possession of private property in order to keep labor disputes from stopping production." The executive powers apart from those of Commander-in-Chief do not extend to lawmaking: "The Constitution limits [the President's] functions in the lawmaking process to the recommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad." Other Presidents may have taken possession
of private property to settle labor disputes; but Congress has not lost its
"exclusive" powers thereby.
From this opinion, by itself, one might conclude that the President is
without power, even in time of total war, to take property without statutory authority as a means of settling labor disputes. That view is confirmed by the concurrence of Justice Douglas, who found that the sanctions for settling labor disputes were for Congress to determine. He put the
legal dilemma: Seizure is a taking, an exertion of the eminent domain power; all takings require, under the Fifth Amendment, payment of just compensation, and the steel companies are entitled to theirs. Where will the
money come from? Only from Congress: "The branch of government that
has the power to pay compensation for a seizure is the only one able to
'35
authorize a seizure or make lawful one that the President had effected.
' 4 Ibid., at 866.
Ibid., at 887. For discussion of the compensation aspects of plant seizures, see United
States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114 (1951), and 1951 Term article at 167-70.
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But the other opinions are not so conclusive:
1. Justice Frankfurter 6 excluded from consideration the powers of the
President in the absence of statute, and "the powers that flow from declared war." Since he read the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act
as one in which "Congress has expressed its will to withhold this power
from the President as though it had said so in so many words," nothing
in his opinion bears on the powers of the President after the expiration of
the Taft-Hartley eighty day period, assuming that Congress did nothing
further during the period by way of settling the strike on its own.
2. Justice Burton's opinion 37 rests squarely on Taft-Hartley; he spoke
of "the clarity of the congressional reservation of seizure for its own consideration." But his list of issues not decided reads like so many negative
pregnants: This is not the case "in which Congress takes no action and outlines no governmental policy." This is not the case of "imminent invasion
or threatened attack." This is not a claimed exercise of the powers of
Commander-in-Chief of a nation "waging, or imminently threatened
with, total war."
3. Justice Clark, concurring only in the judgment of the Court, also had
his reservations. He fully accepted the theory of Presidential emergency
power, a power which "depends upon the gravity of the situation confronting the nation." He apparently thought the Korean and Cold War
situation quite grave enough, except for the fact that "Congress had prescribed methods to be followed by the President in meeting the emergency
at hand." The weight he gave to the Taft-Hartley Act is not clear since
he rested primarily oin the failure to exhaust a seizure provision of the
Selective Service Act of 1948, a statute which had seemed virtually irrelevant to his eight brethren.38
I"Ibid., at 867 et seq.
37 Ibid., at 880 et seq.
38Ibid., at 882. The applicable provision of the Selective Service Act, 62 Stat. 625 (1948),
50 U.S.C.A. App. § 468 (1951), discussed by Justice Clark are subsections (a), (b) and (c).
Those sections give to the President the power to seize industrial facilities which "fail" to
produce materials on compulsory orders, which the President is authorized to make. Justice
Clark's theory is that the President should have placed compulsory orders with strike-bound
plants, and then seized. However the provision applies only to procurement "exchluively for
the use of the armed forces of the United States, or for the use of the Atomic Energy Commission." (Emphasis added.) A very small fraction of steel is used exclusively for this purpose.
Most defense steel comes into government hands indirectly, through private processors. Yet
the President is allowed to seize and operate only "for the production of such articles or materials as may be required by the Government"
This section is not open to the interpretation that the government may also place compulsory orders with steel producers for the benefit of other defense producers and then seize
in case of a strike, because another subdivision of the same general section deals with the very
subject of steel supplies for defense contractors. Subdivision (h) of this very section deals with
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4. Of the majority opinions, that of Justice Jackson remains. Because
this opinion assumes the most serious point in issue in a sentence, its twenty pages are almost tangential to the discussion in which the rest of the
Court was engaged; and yet its common sense does permeate the underlying issues of policy.
Justice Jackson approached the problem by dividing Presidential powers into three areas. First is the area in which the President acts in coordination with Congress, by executing its acts. That case, ex hypothesi, is
not this case, since Congress had not authorized seizure. Second is the area
of Presidential powers concurrent with those of Congress, which is to say
that the President may act until Congress precludes his further action.
Third is the area of exclusive Presidential power, in which Congress is incapable of limiting him.
In this view, the issue necessarily must become whether seizure is in the
second category, i.e., whether Congress has precluded Presidential action.
The case is concededly not in category one, and (apart from Justice Jackson's opinion) no lawyer has yet been heard seriously to suggest that it
belongs in category three. It was conceded by the government and by the
dissent, and indeed can scarcely be rationally doubted, that if Congress
had precluded seizure as a remedy, the President might not seize.
Justice Jackson thus made his case absurdly easy for himself by taking
the case out of the second category with little more than the simple assertion that "It seems clearly eliminated." Listing the relevant statutes, he
disposed of the point with the observation that the President had chosen
"a different and inconsistent way of his own." Once the word "inconsistent" is used, the case is over; but the Justice nonetheless proceeds to
analyze for the remainder of his opinion the point nobody argued, namely
whether the President may fly into the teeth of Congressional will. The
answer, not unexpectedly, is No.
But though his choice of questions to be answered may be odd, the Justice's underlying premise is clear. He obviously believes that in this Resteel explicitly and exclusively and provides for orders for the benefit of contractors who in
turn have "orders for steel products or steel materials required by the armed forces." The
clause was added in Conference, at the insistence of the House Conferees, who reported to the
House that without it there would be nothing in the bill "empowering the President to require
producers of steel to make available to manufacturers having orders for steel products" the
necessary steel. This subdivision also permits seizure, but only on one condition: that the producers refuse to allocate such steel as they do produce in accordance with government orders.
If they produce nothing, because of a strike, there is nothing to allocate, and hence the section
has no application at all in the instant case. See H.R. Rep. No. 2438, 80th Cong. 2d Sess. 50

(1948).
972 S. Ct. 863, 869 (1952).
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public the President has power enough without adding any more. "[A]lmost alone, he fills the public eye and ear.., he exerts a leverage upon
those who are supposed to check and balance his power which often cancels their effectiveness." The country will not suffer "if the Court refuses
further to aggrandize the Presidential office, already so potent and so rela' 40
tively immune from judicial review, at the expense of Congress.
5. The dissent of the Chief Justice, joined by Justices Reed and Minton,
is twice the length of the text of the longest of the other opinions, and approaches its objective on a grand scale. 41 As a matter of strategy, the opinion might have analyzed the constitutional issue in terms of the simple
question of whether the Executive does or does not have one particular
power, that of eminent domain. The opinion starts from this point, but
expands prodigiously. It tells the story of the Korean struggle in its full
economic and legislative setting, and paints a picture-in-implication of a
beleaguered President struggling through the darkness, with a Congress
refusing to provide the necessary light. The Taft-Iartley Act is highlighted as part of a hash of confused labor legislation which, at most, does
not prohibit seizure.
The Chief Justice lays about with a heavy hand, thwacking by quotation of allegedly inconsistent prior positions justices Jackson and Clark
and steel counsel John W. Davis. Each, as former Attorneys General or,
in the case of Mr. Davis, Solicitor General, deserved at least some twitting
for statements made in office. The affirmative argument is essentially that
the President has a power of "leadership," particularly in "national
emergencies" when it becomes his duty "to save [legislative] programs
until Congress could act."
To sustain this premise, the argument blends together every brave act or
daring contemplation of past Presidents, without regard to any particular
relation to eminent domain. George Washington quashed the Whiskey
Rebellion and proclaimed neutrality in the Napoleonic Wars. The Louisiana Purchase, the Emancipation Proclamation, and the breaking of the
Pullman Strike are all recounted, and so is the defense of Iceland by
President Roosevelt.
The central theory of this historical assembly is that if Presidents could
do such great deeds, they can, a fortiori, make industrial seizures. The examples cited "go far beyond the extent of power necessary to sustain the
President's order to seize the steel mills." This is, of course, at once the
strength and the weakness of those precedents. To take the dissenting po10Ibid., at 879.
4

Ibid., at 929.
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sition, one must apparently concede that there is no limit to "leadership"
in "emergencies," so long as willingness to accept Congressional leadership, if ever exercised, is conceded.
(d) The future of seizure. The decision, while wisely putting general
principle ahead of the interest of the immediate situation, nonetheless did
leave the country with no presently available sound basis for quelling production disruption in emergencies. The Taft-Hartley Act provides no solution at the end of its eighty day waiting period; but even more important
is its failure to kindle that sense of fairness to both sides on which, in the
last analysis, a successful labor program depends. In the steel case, had
the President invoked Taft-Hartley instead of seizure, the union would
have been stalled six months (the actual mediation period plus the putative Taft-Hartley period) with nothing to show for their delay.
Because this is so, the Court went out of its way to make clear that the
Congress has all the power it needs to deal fairly with the situation. The
case is in a sense reminiscent of another steel case ten years ago. There, in
United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,4 argued within forty-eight hours of
Pearl Harbor, the issue was whether the government could recover money
allegedly extracted from it by duress in the high-jacking war contracts of
World War I. Justice Black's opinion for the Court, perceiving the inanity
of a system of profit control left to depend on sporadic law suits twentyfive years after the event, rejected the claim of duress and drew a clear
picture of the power of Congress to deal with war profits instantly. Within two months, under the direct spur of the Bethlehem decision, Congress
passed the first Renegotiation Act of World War II.
In the steel seizure case, Black's opinion again specified the powers of
Congress:
It can authorize the taking of private property for public use. It can make laws
regulating the relationships between employers and employees, prescribing rules designed to settle labor disputes, and fixing wages and working conditions in certain
43
fields of our economy.
That is enough power to sustain any emergency labor program Congress
may propose. The power "to settle labor disputes" will sustain even direct
compulsory arbitration, at least within the limits of the 13th Amendment.
At the same time, the opinions do not leave the country powerless in a
total war emergency if Congress fails to create a system of its own. If
total war comes, the three dissenting Justices and perhaps (with diminishing degrees of certainty) Justices Burton, Clark, Jackson and Frankfurter
- 315 U.S. 289 (1942).
4"Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 72 S. Ct. 863, 867 (1952).
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will sustain purely executive seizure. Such a result would not be incompatible with their opinions here. Indeed, if the Taft-Hartley eighty day
period expired without Congressional action, several of these Justices
might sustain executive seizure even in a cold war period.
The real challenge of the opinions is to Congress. Justice Jackson put
it this way:
I have no illusion that any decision by this Court can keep power in the hands of
Congress if it is not wise and timely in meeting its problems.... If not good law, there
was worldly wisdom in the maxim attributed to Napoleon that "The tools belong to the
man who can use them." We may say that power to legislate for emergencies belongs in
the hands of Congress, but only Congress itself can prevent power from slipping through
44
its fingers.
Monopoly and Free Enterprise
Unlike other recent terms, there were no momentous trade regulation
cases in 1951-52. An economic historian doing a study of the United States
in the 1950's would probably not give even footnote mention to any of
this year's decisions.
The Court did deal with a minor problem in the concentration of communication. It upheld a Sherman Act injunction against a Lorain, Ohio,
newspaper publisher who attempted to strangle a local radio station by
refusing to accept ads for the paper from those who also advertised on the
radio. One problem, readily solved, was that of identifying the "commerce" restrained, since the monopoly of the advertising was based on lo45
cal contracts in an Ohio small town.
The Sherman Act was not, however, broad enough to reach an alleged
restraint on medical practice in Oregon. 46 At bottom was the resistance of
state medical association leaders to contract, or group, medicine; but the
actual warfare between the groups and the profession was won by the
groups almost ten years ago. They are here to stay; the cruder forms of infighting are over, and the Court held that past wars are irrelevant for purposes of obtaining a decree now. With a fine intention to join what they
could not lick, the state association then set up its own system of contract
medicine, controlled by itself. The government proceeded against the
state association and its affiliates, first on the ground of its attempt to
monopolize medical practice by driving the contract groups out of business, and second on the ground of restraint of competition in that the
Association kept its own state contract medicine organization out of
Ibid., at 879-80.
4 Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
" United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc., 343 U.S. 326 (1952).

4
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counties where Association-affiliated local groups sought the same business.
On the first count the Court refused an injunction, particularly in view
of the pre-1941 age of many of the Association's misdeeds. On the second,
it found the restraint, such as it was, not "unreasonable," since it saw no
advantage in having the same doctors on two local lists, one sponsored by
a state and the other by the county medical association. On this, as on the
whole case, the decision was basically an acceptance of the facts as found
by the trial court. Moreover, it found no commerce involved in this local
division of the market. The Court said in essence that the "furnishing of
prepaid medical care on a local plane" is not "interstate commerce." The
occasional payments for the benefits of persons who moved out of state it
found "sporadic and incidental."
(The Court observed "in passing" that "forms of competition usual in
the business world may be demoralizing to the ethical standards of a profession." In further recognition of the sometimes peculiar ethical sense of
the medical and allied professions, the Court in a tax case held the third
of the retail cost of eyeglasses kicked back by optical companies to the
eye doctors who sent them patients was deductible as ordinary and necessary business expense. 47 The medical profession, however, stands alone on
this profitable island of ethics; payment of attorneys' fees for contesting
a federal gift tax was not deductible.4 8)

A case which covered no new ground, but nonetheless made a contribution to general understanding by its succinct application of principle was
United States v. New Wrinkle, Ic. 49 In 1937 two patent holders on a type
of paint formed a patent holding company to license use of their patents
to those who would charge minimum prices for the paint. By 1948, 200
companies, amounting to the entire industry, were licensed and the licensing company had, by progressively more complicated licenses, rigidified
the most minute details of the sales practices of the industry. The issue in
the action to enjoin this license system was whether, under the General
Electric50 rule, the price fixing was a legitimate condition of a patent
license. The Court held that it was not legitimate, following its Line Ma47Lilly v. Comm'r, 343 U.S. 90 (1952).
4
8 Lykes v. United States, 343 U.S. 118 (1952). The statutory interpretation problems in
these two tax cases are of course wholly different, the second dealing with a gift tax provision
which has no relevance in the first. The point being made above is only that as between two
professions, the doctors get all the breaks.
49 342 U.S. 371 (1952).
10United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
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terial and U.S. Gypsum5' holdings that the General Electric rule does not
sanctify patent pools; and, moreover, that industry wide license agreements "establish a prima facie case of conspiracy."
Other Problems of Business
In 1951 there was a miscellany of unrelated business problems of no
broad social significance. In the tax field, an extortioner is now, five to
four, subject to income tax on the money he extorts, though an embezzler
still is not.52 While a high authority has informally advised this writer that

the decision is of some consequence, it seems doubtful that because of it
any appreciable number of extortioners will either stop their extorting or
start sharing the proceeds with the government; and it seems equally unlikely that any number who escape conviction on the substantive offense
will be picked up by the Bureau.
Government construction contracts usually provide that the department head's conclusions of fact are final. There is an implied exception for
cases of fraud. In UnitedStates v. Wutnderlich,53 the Court of Claims found
a decision by the Secretary of Interior "arbitrary," "capricious" and
"grossly erroneous." But, said the Supreme Court, this does not equate to
fraud-the Secretary's determination is final unless he is guilty of "conscious wrongdoing, an intention to cheat or be dishonest." Justices
Douglas and Reed, dissenting, regretted giving, in practical operation, the
power of a "ruthless master" to a contracting officer; and justice Jackson,
dissenting, made very clear that no precedent required this result.
A substantial new development in the interstate tax area was Standard
Oil Co. v. Peck.54 It held, as a matter of due process, that Ohio might not
place an ad valorem personal property tax on the ships of an Ohio corporation which operated on the Mississippi River, but were in Ohio waters
only negligibly. Concededly under earlier cases, the state of corporate
domicile had a fair claim to tax the property. The issue had been one of tax
situs, and unless the vessel acquired tax situs elsewhere, it was presumed
to be subject to taxation at its corporate home. Ocean going vessels, obviously wanting in situs elsewhere, were taxable at the state of incorpora56
tion;55 and so were interstate railroads and airlines.
51United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948); United States v. U.S. Gypsum
Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948).
52Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130 (1952).
"2342 U.S. 98 (1951).

54

342 U.S. 382 (1952).

"The leading case is Southern Pacific Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U.S. 63 (1911).
"N.Y. Central R.R. v. Miller, 202 U.S. 584 (1906); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292 (1944).
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The Peck case, in ending this condition for vessels on inland waters, introduced a new precedent and a new rule. The precedent was Olt v. Mississippi Barge Line,57 which had held that vessels on inland waters were
subject to taxation by a state in which they operated, so long as the tax
was apportioned to the number of miles the vessel operated in the state.
The case is obviously tangential, since the taxing state there was not the
state of domicile, and the record showed that some of the property involved had gained tax situs in that state. In the instant case, there was no
showing that the vessels were with great frequency in any one state, and
it was clear that they were not in fact taxed elsewhere. For the Court it
was enough that they might conceivably be taxed elsewhere, and it said
The rule which permits taxation by two or more states on an apportionment basis
precludes taxation of all of the property by the state of the domicile. Otherwise there
would be multiple taxation of interstate operations and the tax would have no relation
to the opportunities, benefits, or protection which the taxing state gives those operation.5 8

Justice Minton, dissenting, warmly protested the use of the doctrine of
avoidance of multiple taxation when its effect, as here, was to permit the

corporation to avoid even single taxation.
Last of the miscellaneous business cases was the decision59 upholding an
old Missouri statute which provides that employees of businesses in the
state may have up to four hours off on election days to vote-and that
their employer must pay them for the time off. Justice Douglas, for the
Court, conceded that "The legislative power has limits," but found this
simply another form of minimum wage requirement, and that its object of
getting out the vote was perfectly permissible.
The statute, though probably unwise, seems so clearly valid under the
decisions of recent years on due process that it would go unnoticed were

it not for the dissent of Justice Jackson. This dissent is a minor milestone
in that it is believed to be the first occasion on which any Justice appointed in the past fifteen years has voted to invalidate any business regulatory
statute on the good old due process ground that the statute is so offensive
policy-wise that it should not be allowed to stand. Justice Jackson had no
precedents, but he excoriated the statute on the merits:
Because a State may require payment of a minimum wage for hours that are worked
it does not follow that it may compel payment for time that is not worked.... I do
not question that the incentive which this statute offers will help swell the vote; to
57 336
5

U.S. 169 (1949).
8Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382, 384-85 (1952).
5
9 Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Mfissouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952).
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require that employees be paid time-and-a-half would swell it still more, and doubletime would do even better. But does the success of an enticement to vote justify putting
its cost on some other citizen? 60
It is only the touch of a vanished hand, but even the faint sound of this
voice once still reminds us that the natural law conception of due process,
as applied to business regulations, may return to our midst again.
III. CIVIL RIGHTS

Aside from the movie case"' and one bail case,6 2 human liberty made no
important progress in any Supreme Court decisions this year. It lost considerable ground. As was noted earlier, of twenty divided civil rights cases
this year, the decision went against the claimed right in fifteen; and most
of the remaining five cases were insubstantial.
(a) Speech, Press, Movies. The principal free speech decision of the year
was Adler v. Board of Education,6 3 upholding New York's Feinberg Law.
A principal harassment device of the current Repression had been that of
proving guilt not by deed, but by association; that is to say, proving the
guilt of the accused by showing that he associated with X who associated
with Y and so on to the Communist who polluted the whole circle, or by
showing membership in a group which is found to have malign objectives.
The Court had not previously come squarely to grips with that device.6 4
In the Adler case it explicitly took up that matter. It found the device
more than merely permissible; it found it just dandy.
The Feinberg Law aimed in the general direction of protecting the
school children of New York from Communist propaganda. One method
of giving such protection would be to punish those who in fact actually
propagandized students; but, as the Court synthesized the legislative finding, "This propaganda ...is sufficiently subtle to escape detection in the
class room."' 5 Hence the legislature sought a litmus paper test under
which the color pink would show without the necessity of considering what
the teacher actually did while teaching.
It found its solution through the device of excluding from teaching
those affiliated with offensive organizations. The actual mechanics are
these: The State Board of Regents makes a list of organizations which
60

Ibid., at 426-27.

6 Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
63342 U.S. 485 (1952).
61The case most nearly in point is Garner v. Los Angeles Board of Education, 341 U.S.
716 (1951), on the Los Angeles municipal oath.
6 Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485, 490 (1952).
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"advocate, advise, teach, or embrace the doctrine" of either (a) forceful
overthrow of the government, or (b) the "necessity or propriety of adopting any such doctrine." The organization may, if it will, appeal to the
courts for review of its inclusion, although if it does not have sufficient interest to do so, the individual teacher is subsequently precluded from raising the question. Membership in the organizations becomes "prima facie
evidence of disqualification for appointment to or retention in any"
teaching position. The suspected teacher must then present "substantial
evidence" to rebut the presumption that he is subversive.
Two main constitutional objections were raised to the Feinberg Law,
one central and the other peripheral. The central objection was that under
the First Amendment, teachers have an equal right with anyone else to be
members of organizations when membership is not unlawful for others.
Hence, runs the argument, their jobs can not be made dependent on legal
political associations. The peripheral objection is that the prima facie
presumption clause of the Act creates a presumption unconstitutional
under the due process clause. But, under the precedents, the presumption
is not more extreme than has been upheld before, and Justice Minton for
the majority had no serious difficulty in overcoming this obstacle.6 The
dissenters did not object on this point.
The real issue is the first one, the substantive right of the individual
teacher to belong to organization on the list without prejudice to his position. Here Justice Minton is concise and blunt:
1. This is not an interference with free speech because persons "have no
right to work for the State in the school system on their own terms."
Teachers have an option to conform or get out: "If they do not choose to
work on such terms, they are at liberty to retain their beliefs and associa67

tions and go elsewhere.1

2. Obviously, teachers may be discharged if they directly advocate
overthrow of the government themselves, citing Gitlow v. New York. (The
citation is of interest only because this is the first time in over twenty
years that the Gitlow case has been cited with approval for its substantive
holding; only last year this same Court declared that the minority rather
than the majority opinion was the law.)68
6The line between permissible and impermissible presumptions in civil cases is thin, cf.
Western & AUt. R.R. v. Henderson, 279 U.S. 639 (1929) (impermissible), and Mobile, J. &
K.C. R.R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35 (1910) (permissible), but the Adler case seems clearly
comparable to Turnipseed.
67 Both quotes are from 342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952).
68268 U.S. 652 (1925). In Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 507 (1951), the Chief
Justice after discussing Gitlow said, "Although no case subsequent to Whitney and Gitlow
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3. They may, equally, be discharged if they are members of organizations
which have such objectives. The Court is not disturbed by the conception
of guilt by association: "One's associates, past and present, as well as one's
conduct, may properly be considered in determining fitness and loyalty.
From time immemorial, one's reputation has been determined by the company he keeps. In the employment of officials and teachers of the school
system, the state may very properly inquire into the company they keep."
Indeed, the opinion contains words of exhortation to the effect that this
is just what the school systems ought to do: they "have the right and the
duty."6 9
The Adler opinion, like it or not, has the great merit of candor. There is
no aura of pretense to it, no seeming but insubstantial reservation of individual right, not even a conventional bow to the usages of academic freedom. It is the legal statement of the popular aphorisms, "If he doesn't
like it here, let him go back where he came from"; and Walter Winchell's,
"If a bird goes around with ducks, it's a duck."
It evoked a dissent from Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Black,
which makes head on collision. The vice of the statute is guilt by association rather than by deed. It is
certain to raise havoc with academic freedom. Youthful indiscretions, mistaken causes,
misguided enthusiasms-all long forgotten-become the ghosts of a harrowing present.

Fearing condemnation, [the teacher] will tend to shrink from any association that stirs
controversy. In that manner freedom of expression will be stifled.
The law inevitably turns the school system into a spying project.... What was the
significance of the reference of the art teacher to socialism? Why was the history teacher
so openly hostile to Franco Spain? Who heard overtones of revolution in the English
teacher's discussion of the Grapes of Wrath?... Where suspicion fills the air and holds
scholars in line for fear of their jobs, there can be no exercise of the free intellect.
[This does not at all mean that the classroom may become a Communist cell.] ....But
the guilt of the teacher should turn on overt acts. So long as she is a law abiding citizen,
so long as her performance within the public school system meets professional standards,
her private life, her political philosophy, her social creed should not be the cause of
70
reprisals against her.

The most puzzling aspect of Adler is its scope. Under the recent deci-

sions, it is obvious that public employees are fair game for the loyalty
has expressly overruled the majority opinions in those cases, there is little doubt that subsequent opinions have inclined toward the Holmes-Brandeis rationale." In Beauhamais v.
Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 295 (1952), Justice Jackson in an individual dissent says, "As the principle by which to judge the constitutionality of this statute, I accept the dissent in Gitlow."
Yet both join in Adler, in which, as noted, the Gitlow majority opinion is the sole authority
cited on the point discussed above.
61Both quotes are from 342 U.S. 485, 493 (1952).
70The Douglas dissent is at 342 U.S. 485, 508-11 (1952).
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hunt. Federal, municipal, and state loyalty programs have now been upheld.' How about private employment? Can Congress or legislatures exclude persons from all jobs because of their associations, or merely from
public positions?
The Douds case 72 held that Communists could be excluded from key
posts in labor relations, but it by no means answered the whole question
as to the scope of power. Whether Adler moves further depends on the one
point on which it is confusing. Was it following what might be called the
"outlaw theory" of public employment,73 holding essentially that public
employees have no rights in their jobs and therefore have no standing to
raise free speech objections if their jobs are taken from them; or, in the
alternative, was it holding the Act valid under the First Amendment? If
the latter, then presumably a similar act would be equally valid as to any
employees, public or private, whom the legislature can reach with the
police power, at least so long as they are in a "sensitive area."
On the one hand, the opinion states the issue in terms of the absence of
a "right" in public employment; apparently teachers have none, although
in passing there is a suggestion that they must be dealt with on "reasonable terms." On the other hand, the statute is justified in terms of the
school as a "sensitive area," a center of the states' "vital concern," as to
which the state, as quoted above, has "the right and the duty to screen
the officials, teachers, and employees." These observations might be equally applicable to dairy employees (protection against germ warfare), employees of steel mills (there ought to be a "vital concern" in the avoidance
of waste of materials), and television performers (Howdy Doody's propaganda, if any, is certainly "sufficiently subtle to escape detection" on the
air, and he reaches far more "young minds" than any teacher does). It is
not clear whether or not Adler would be a precedent to uphold a law
aimed at employees in those classes.
The Court, in Beauharnaisv. Illinois,7 4 did uphold one statute which
dearly limits the speech of everyone. The issue there was the validity of
Illinois' so-called group libel law, as applied to a person who was circulating a petition to the Chicago city council to adopt an ordinance segregating the city on racial lines.
"Garner v. Los Angeles Board of Education, 341 U.S. 716 (1951); Bailey v. Richardson,
341 U.S. 918 (1951); and the Adler case.
72 American Communication Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950), upheld an exclusionary
statute for union officials, stressing that the number of persons involved was small and their
positions crucial.
73 United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1942).
4343 U.S. 250 (1952).
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Two documents are relevant, the statute and the petition. The statute
makes it an offense "to manufacture, sell ...

advertise or publish, present

or exhibit" any "lithograph, moving picture, play, drama or sketch, which
publication or exhibition portrays depravity, criminality, unchastity, or
lack of virtue of a class of citizens, of any race, color, creed or religion" if
it exposes those citizens "to contempt, derision, or obloquy or ... is productive of breach of the peace or riots."
Beauharnais violated this statute by displaying a "lithograph," or
printed matter as the Illinois Supreme Court defined that term, through
his agents, on Chicago's street corners. The lithograph was a leaflet of
about sixty lines plus an application form for membership in defendant's
organization, the "White Circle League of America." The top of the leaflet
in large type proclaimed: "Preserve and protect white neighborhoods." It
disclaimed being "against the Negro," but spoke of the Negro "invasion"
of the South Side of the City, alluded to Communism "rife among the
Negroes," and asked the city authorities for action "through the exercise
of the Police Power" to stop these Negro encroachments.
The application form and the petition just described occupy about two
thirds of the leaflet. It was not contended that anything in them violated
the statute. The remaining third is an appeal for membership in the
White Circle League to oppose the Truman civil rights program which,
with kindred movements, has "the object of mongrelizing the white race."
There is further need to defend against the "rapes, robberies, knives,
guns and marihuana of the Negro." It accepts the "challenge" to the
white race, which it proclaims will never suffer itself to be the victim of
"forced mongrelization."
The defendant was convicted of violating the Illinois statute, and the
Supreme Court upheld the validity of the act. Justice Frankfurter for the
Court described the statute as a criminal libel law. It would unquestionably be libelous falsely to charge an individual "with being a rapist, robber, carrier of knives and guns, user of marihuana," and it can be equally
libelous to say the same thing about groups. Illinois has had serious
troubles with racial tensions, and while this legislation may very possibly
not help, "It would be out of bounds for the judiciary to deny the legislature a choice of policy, provided it is not unrelated to the problem and not
forbidden by some explicit limitation on the State's power."75 The clear
and present danger test is irrelevant, because it does not apply to libelous
any more than to obscene speech.
Four Justices dissented. Justice Jackson's7 6 was almost as much a con75Ibid., at 262.

7

Ibid., at 287.
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currence as a dissent, but was indeed provocative. In concurring vein, he
observed that this legislation would be invalid under the First Amendment, if the First Amendment were applicable; but further consideration
had now led him to reverse his own position of many years standing that
the First Amendment is to be considered as applicable to the states via the
Fourteenth. That latter amendment makes not the precise terms of the
First Amendment applicable to the states, but only "the general principle
of free speech." Group criminal libel laws may be valid for states; this
particular application, however, was invalid because the trial court did
not permit the defendant to offer proof of the truth of the matter published. In Justice Jackson's view this is part of substantive due process.
Justice Reed,7 7 joined by Justice Douglas, dissented on the ground that
the statute was void as vague, in its use of such general terms as "virtue,"
"derision" and "obloquy."
Justices Black and Douglas together, and Justice Douglas individually,
also dissented on the merits of the legislation. justice Black's major objections were, first, that the document was a bona fide petition to lawfully
constituted authorities asking them to take action of a sort at least arguably within their powers. The right to petition is thus abridged. Second,
the Court applies the so-called "rational basis" test to the legislation, ignoring the higher standard to which laws interfering with First Amendment rights had previously been held. Third, group libel laws are so fundamentally different from individual libel laws that they should not be allowed at all; so much modem legislation involves huge groups that it is
almost impossible to talk about major areas of public affairs without running the risk of offending some group. There is nothing here for judicial
review on a case by case basis:
To say that a legislative body can, with this Court's approval, make it a crime to
petition for and publicly discuss proposed legislation seems ...far-fetched to me.... I
think the First Amendment, with the Fourteenth, "absolutely" forbids such laws
without any "ifs" or "buts" or "whereases." ' 8
It remains to appraise. In this critic's opinion, the decision is unsound,
and a most undesirable deviation from precedent, on three separate
grounds.
First, it is wrong on its facts. What this defendant had to say about Negroes, however offensive it may be, was well within the style in which
vast numbers of excitable Americans do talk about groups. Without question, the defendant was within his rights in petitioning for a system of seg77Ibid., at 277.
78 Ibid.,

at 275.
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regation by zoning. just such legislation, though probably unconstitutional in any guise'7 has been familiar enough in American cities, and Americans ought to be free, however mistaken their motives, to try to devise
a valid separation system if they want to. Equally, the defendant is within his rights in organizing to resist the President's civil rights program; a
minor political party, dominant in some Southern states in 1948, took a position much more extreme and vigorous than his, and, most seriously,
it would presumably be illegal for their candidate for President to campaign in Illinois under this decision.
The only passage of the leaflet which conceivably portrays Negro "depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue" is the line which refers
to their "rapes, robberies, knives, guns, and marihuana." This is approximately one per cent of the leaflet, buried in its middle; and while it is not
nice talk, it certainly reaches no new depths in the hyperbole of American
politics.
The factual aspects of the case are worth dwelling on because they highlight the evil of this kind of legislation. Granting that the First Amendment is not an absolute, and that grave enough circumstances may warrant suspension of the right of speech, this passing nastiness is no substantial menace to anything. Every repression of free speech, on the other
hand, is a menace to an American ideal.
Second, it is wrong on its law. The most significant aspect of the case is
the ultimate triumph of the so-called "rational basis" approach of Justice
Frankfurter to the testing of state legislation challenged under the First
Amendment. In this the Justice has been more consistent than the Court.
The battle began with the flag salute cases, in which Justice Frankfurter
was driven to momentary defeat, still proclaiming that flag salute legislation was valid because legislators might rationally suppose that such legislation promoted the legitimate goal of national unity." It was Justice
Stone first,"' and Justice Jackson later,8 2 who proclaimed the counter philosophy that, where the First Amendment is involved, a rational basis is
not enough to support legislation.
The standard of review in this area is dispositive of the case. If a legislative rational basis is enough to sustain a requirement that children salute
the flag each morning, for example, then that requirement should be held
79 Cf. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
20 Cf. Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), and West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).

81

United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938).

82

In the Barnette case, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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valid for it is not irrational in the sense of being fraudulent, capricious, or
downright deranged. It is simply wrong. So with the group libel law; it is
not legislative madness, it is simply legislative error.
Of late, the Court has been tacitly but not avowedly applying the rational basis test to free speech restrictions. In-the Beaukarnais case it
comes all the way and gives the name to the deed. Justice Jackson recants,8 1 the rest of the majority is substantially entirely post-Stone, and
Justice Frankfurter marches triumphantly along in the same path he has
regularly followed. Persistence wins, and perhaps the flag salute will again
have a turn at being valid if it comes back again.
But the late Chief Justice Stone was right in the first place. He contended that First Amendment rights could not be left to the chance of
legislative experimentation because repression of those rights blocks the
one device by which electorate can induce the legislature to change its
mind; an "experiment" with the suppression of free speech has the lasting
qualities of an experiment with suicide. Justice Frankfurter concedes that
this may be bad legislation, but says that this "is the price to be paid for
the trial-and-error inherent in legislative efforts to deal with obstinate so'84
cial issues."
But the very statute in question blocks the path of its repeal. This is
no case of, e.g., anti-oleomargarine legislation which may be passed today
and repealed tomorrow. The only people with a substantial, nontheoretical interest in repealing the Illinois group libel law are those who have
something critical they want to say about Negroes, Jews, Italians, Irish,
Catholics, Spanish Americans or some other group. This one may want the
law repealed so that he may campaign more effectively, as Beauharnais
campaigned, for a greater degree of segregation. That one may want it
repealed so that he can more freely oppose a Presidential candidate who
endorses a Fair Employment Practices Commission. A third wants to protect public school funds from what he sincerely regards as a "Catholic
menace."
None of them can candidly attempt to build up popular support for the
repeal of this legislation without stating their underlying objectives, and
yet they can not state their objectives without risking violation of this
vague, shotgun type law they seek to repeal. In this field, experimentation
is stopped dead.
Third, the case is wrong in principle. Beauharnais certainly has a right
8- Indeed, Justice Jackson in effect repudiated his former position in American Communication Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 423 n. 1 (1950).
8
4Beauharnais v. fllinois, 343 U.S. 250, 262 (1952).
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to say that some Negroes are marihuana users, knife carriers, and rapists.
He also had a right to imply that all are. There is social loss in permitting
him such conduct; but the country was committed 160 years ago to the
proposition that the resultant gain in freedom is worth the loss. As Justice
Jackson's opinion shows, there is no substantial difference between the
Illinois law and the Sedition Act of 1798 except that the former forbids
disparagement of racial and religious groups, and the latter forbade disparagement of political groups.85 The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People rose far above self-interest in opposing this
prosecution.
The major, and indeed the only, "pro" free speech cases of the year were
those concerned with movie censorship. In the Miracle case,86 the Court
caught up with an anachronism.
In 1915, the Court in the Mutual Film case 87 held that the First Amendment and the Fourteenth were irrelevant to movie censorship; that movies
were simply and exclusively business of producing spectacles for profit,
and not any "part of the press of the country," or of any concern as
"organs of public opinion."
This may have been true in those pre-Birth of a Nation days; but
scarcely anyone would now doubt that movies, though still profit seekers
in the same sense that the press seeks profit, have become a most important "organ of public opinion." While the proportion of its focus on public
matters is much smaller than that of the press, its practical effectiveness
88
may be far greater.

In the Miracle decision, the Court finally overruled the Mutual Film
case and held that movies, too, are entitled to at least some kind of freedom
from censorship.
The Miracle is a forty minute film produced in Italy, in Italian with
English subtitles. Its subject is the seduction of a demented goat tender by
someone she supposes to be St. Joseph, and her resultant illusion that she
has conceived immaculately. There are sharp differences of opinion among
81The parallel language is: Illinois statute, Ill. Rev. Stat. (1951) c. 38, § 471: "manufacture,
sell, or offer for sale, advertise, or publish" the named categories of publications "which publication portrays depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class of citizens...
and ...exposes the citizens of any race.., to contempt, derision, or obloquy." The Sedition
Act, 1 Stat. 570 (1798): "write, print, utter or publish.., any false, scandalous and malicious
writing or writings against the government of the United States, or either house of the Congress of the United States or the President of the United States, with intent to defame... or
bring them, or either of them, into contempt or disrepute.
86Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
8
7Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230 (1915).
88 The literature is voluminous. See, e.g., Inglis, Freedom of the Movies (1947).
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the acquaintances of this writer who have seen it as to whether it is, by
ordinary movie-goer standards, a good or a poor movie; but no one has
suggested that it is, in a pornographic sense, vulgar. Reviewers comments
are collected in a note to Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion which
shows that professional opinions ranged from "leaves a very bad taste in
one's mouth" (N.Y. Herald Tribune) to "overpowering and provocative"
(N.Y. Times).89

Under New York censorship law, licenses are to be given by a state official supervising movie censorship unless the movie is "obscene, indecent,
immoral, inhuman, sacrilegious, or ... would tend to corrupt morals or incite to crime." This movie was licensed under that statute, and ran for
eight weeks at a small New York specialty theater which concentrates on
foreign productions.
During this period the picture was denounced as sacrilegious by New
York's Cardinal Spellman and was picketed by the Catholic War Veterans.90 The state licensing authority thereupon re-inspected the picture,
found it sacrilegious, and withdrew its license.
The Court, in an opinion by justice Clark, suggested that movies, for
the very reason of their great impact on the popular mind, might have to
be subject to community control; but that this necessity, even if it exists,
"does not authorize substantially unbridled censorship such as we have
here." The Mutual Film case, it observed, antedated the whole conception
that freedom of speech and of the press were protected in any degree by
the Fourteenth Amendment; and the case was overruled as obsolete.
Since movies may not be subject to unlimited censorship, the next question considered by justice Clark is whether the particular kind of censorship used in New York is permissible. It is not valid because, says the Justice, it is a previous restraint, a licensing device which is to be especially
condemned unless there is some special justification for it. Such a special
justification would have to be a narrow exception, and a test as elusive as
"sacrilegious" is far too imprecise to do. Justices Reed, Frankfurter, and
Jackson concurred specially, the Frankfurter-Jackson opinion concluding
that the term "sacrilegious," as used by the New York authorities, has no
meaning with which a court can review an administrative agency.
A week after the Miracle decision the Court reversed without opinion
(other than the citation of the Miracle case and one other decision on the
89 Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 n. 14 (1952).
90 These details are taken from Justice Frankfurter's opinion which also makes clear that
Catholic opinion here and abroad was by no means unanimously opposed to the circulation of
the movie. On the merits of the movie itself, the Washington rumor is that at least some of the
Justices who saw the film thought it very poor entertainment.
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requirement of statutory definiteness) a Texas decision upholding the conviction of a Texas theater operator who displayed the movie Pinky after
being denied a license by local censors." Pinky, an American made movie,
is the story of a Negro girl so close to the color line that she passed as
white in the North, became engaged to a white man there, and then returned to the South. The Texas censorship authorities found the film objectionable for reasons related to the fact that it suggested, without complete disapprobation, the possibility of "miscegenation."
The Miracle and Pinky cases require either the scuttling or the rewriting of state movie censorship laws. Such laws have as their purpose the desire to prevent obscenity or other offenses against dominant religious, economic, or pressure groups. Justice Clark's opinion is particularly careful
to put aside without a ruling the question of obscenity when raised "under
a clearly-drawn statute."
While the decision is momentous and long overdue, its practical consequences in terms of movies to be seen are likely to be extremely narrow.
Pinky is an extreme exception among American movies in dealing with a
controversial subject; and the Legion of Decency and private censorship
within the industry would have strangled The Miracle, if it had been an
American production, long before it reached the New York censorship office. The industry shivers under attack from anyone with a loud voice, and
at the moment is in the process of sifting over 200 of its personnel for no
better reason than that the American Legion has some doubts about
them.92 The largest practical results may be to a few so-called "art theaters" around the country, where foreign films reach only a trifling audience.
But, in the long run, it may have the effect of contributing a little courage to a TV-scared, pressure-group-scared, Un-American-Activitiesscared industry. At least the producers, if they can't talk back to anyone
else, can now at least have the pleasure of cocking a snoot at the policeman.
(b) Religion. Four years ago the Court, in McCollum v. Board of Education,93 invalidated the Champaign, Illinois, release time system for giving
religious education to children in the public schools. The result has been a
91Gelling v. Texas, 343 U.S. 960 (1952).
2

9 N.Y. Times § 1, p. 1, col. 2 (May 23, 1952); N.Y. Times § 2, p. 1, col. 1 (June 1, 1952).
g3 333 U.S. 203 (1948). For a collection of references to the abundant literature on the subject, see Note to the McCollum case in Frank, Cases and Materials on Constitutional Law 874
(rev. ed., 1952).
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flood of debate, pro and con, which has by far eclipsed all other Supreme
Court decisions of the last decade in popular attention.
At the term just passed, it turned out that the McCollum case had needlessly excited the public; it was all a matter of form. The Illinois system
had offended aganst the constitutional principle of separation of church
and state in two respects; first, the religious education, though carried on
by private instructors, was physically on the school property; and second,
the whole school machinery was used to insure that the children whose
parents wished them to attend the religious training did in fact do so.
This year in Zorach v. Clauson94 the Court upheld the New York release
time system. That system differed from the Champaign system in one, and
one only, important respect; the religious education was off the school
premises. Otherwise the school machinery was used in the same way to
round up the children and deliver them to their religious tutors.
The Zorach case falls about half-way between an overruling and a distinction of the McCollum decision. In its most important respects, it limits
to the point of overruling. In McCollum the Court had separately stated
the vices of the Champaign system; "not only" were the public school
buildings used, but "also" the compulsory school machinery was used to
insure the presence of the children in religious classes. This latter element,
alluded to as a separate and distinct item, had been termed "not separation of church and state." As justice Jackson, dissenting in Zorach, said,
"The distinction attempted between [McCollum] and this is trivial, almost
to the point of cynicism, magnifying its nonessential details and disparaging compulsion which was the underlying reason for invalidity."95
On the other hand, Justice Douglas, for the 6-3 majority, found no inconsistency; after all, in McCollum, in which he was of the majority, the
religious education had been on school property, and here it was not. Parents and students have a free choice as to whether they will take the religious education or not. (So, in equal degree, did they in McCollum.) Too
many concessions cannot be made to the "fastidious atheist or agnostic."
This is not mingling of church and state; it is merely a "systematized program" of "cooperation." After all, "We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being," and the Constitution does not require "a callous indifference to religious groups." This is mere neutrality,
a suspension of governmental operations "as to those who want to repair
to their religious sanctuary for worship or instruction." "We follow the
McCollum case" without expanding it into "hostility to religion."
94343 U.S. 306 (1952).

- Ibid., at 325.
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The majority opinion is by no means a complete concession to the antiMcCollum point of view; for example, it reaffirms the McCollum dictum
that "Government may not finance religious groups." But it does undercut McCollum to the extent that it approves religious education during
school time, the school stimulating the taking of the religious training by
occupying the remaining children with busy work and by directing the
religious students, with all the force of the schools' prestige behind the
directive, to go the place of religious training. As Justice Douglas notes, it
is not clearfrcm the record whether "the public schools enforce attendance
at religious schools by punishing absentees from the released time programs for truancy." What we do not know from the record, we do know
as a matter of fact. Under the New York system, "In enforcing the truancy law upon release time truants, some school districts interview the child
to find out why he did not attend the religious instruction. Other districts,
if the child is frequently truant, refuse him permission to be released for
religious instruction. Still others use these techniques jointly."9 8 In other
words, the schools use truancy pressures to insure the delivery of their
charges.
The very reason that such facts are not in the record is the occasion of
the dissent of Justice Frankfurter. There is no factual record in the
Zorach case, and there should have been. The complaint alleged that the
children are in fact coerced into attendance. The majority concedes that
if in fact there was coercion, the practice would be unconstitutional. Yet
the trial court refused to permit the introduction of that very evidence,
considering it irrelevant. As Justice Frankfurter says, "When constitutional issues turn on facts, it is a strange procedure indeed not to permit
97
the facts to be established.1
But the largest vice of the decision is less its holding than its tone. It
adopts as precedents the very practices that were considered relevant only
by the single dissenting Justice in the McCollum case.9" Its passing derogation of the "fastidious agnostic," its approval of "cooperation" between
church and state, betoken a retreat which may extend across the boards.
Justice Black, author of McCollum and dissenter here, was unrepentant
of his earlier stand. Recognizing the "searching examination" to which
McCollum had been exposed in the intervening years, he chose the occasion "to reaffirm my faith in the fundamental philosophy" expressed
9Released

Time Reconsidered: The New York Plan Is Tested, 61 Yale L.J. 405 (1952).

97 343 U.S. 306, 322 (1952).

98 E.g., prayers in legislatures, the Thanksgiving Day proclamations, "So help me God" in
the courtroom, etc.
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earlier. In the instant case, "the sole question is whether New York can
use its compulsory education laws to help religious sects get attendants
presumably too unenthusiastic to go unless moved to do so by the pressure
of this state machinery." Whatever else it is, this is no separation of church
and state, and "Government should not be allowed, under cover of the
soft euphemism of 'co-operation,' to steal into the sacred area of religious
choice."9 9
As for practical consequences, release time involved about 2,000,000
students in 2,200 communities across the country in 1952.100 About eleven
per cent of the school systems abandoned released time altogether after
McCollum, four state Attorneys General interpreting McCollum as requiring this. Others had, after McCollum, retreated a step by taking released
time out of the schoolhouse proper, and following the New York system.
These systems are now saved; those who" abandoned released time altogether after McCollum may now, if they wish, put it back in this faintly
modified form.
(c) Privacy. One of the troubles with modern government and with
modern science, for all their virtues, is that as each expands it becomes
harder and harder for the individual to draw into himself and be alone if
he wishes. This right of privacy, this capacity of the law abiding individual
to be some place where neither his government, nor salesmen, nor anyone
else can get at him ought to be the last bulwark of human dignity in this
mechanical age. Our affirmative liberties,' 0' our right to speak, our right
to petition-perhaps these must dwindle in the world in which we live. If
they must, then at least we should preserve a liberty to be let alone.
When Brandeis wrote his seminal article on the right of privacy in 1890,
he foretold the day when man would be tracked to his last lair by snooping, penetrating mechanical gadgets. 10 When Orwell composed his nightmare of 1984, the ultimate horror he could think of in the extremest
reaches of the destruction of human dignity and independence was the
telescreen by which Big Brother could know everything happening in a
3

man's house.11

99 343 U.S. 306, 320 (1952).
100

The facts here are taken from the Note, op. cit. supra note 96.

101The phrase is suggested by Freund, On Understanding the Supreme Court 22 (1949).
102
"Nlumerous mechanical devices threaten to make good the prediction that 'what is
whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops.' "Warren and Brandeis, The
Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 195 (1890).

1

0s The comparison with Orwell is suggested in Judge Frank's dissenting opinion in the case
about to be discussed, United States v. On Lee, 193 F. 2d 306, 311, 317 (C.A. 2d, 1951).
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Episode one. On Lee, a Chinese laundryman who doubtless peddled
opium in his spare time, was out on bail pending his trial. He was running
his laundry and minding his own business when Chin Poy, a former employee, dropped in for a visit. What On Lee did not know-who would?
-was that Chin Poy was wired for sound with a Dick Tracy-like gadget
which carried the conversation to a Narcotics Bureau agent some distance
away. The conversation, as reported by the agent, was introduced into
evidence against On Lee and was challenged as a violation of the search
and seizure provisions of the Fourth Amendment, of the Federal Communications Act, and of general principles of fair play.
Episode two. In February, 1949, the Capital Transit Co., to pick up an
extra $15,264 a year, began broadcasting a conglomerate of music, news,
announcements, and ads on an eight hour a day schedule on 212 busses
and streetcars. The return to Capital went up as more units were added.
Most Washingtonians work in a fairly small area, in which there is not
enough parking space to handle even a small part of the employees should
they use their own cars. Taxis are no regular solution. The practical result
is that most Washingtonians are a captive audience and are compelled to
listen to Capital's choice of entertainment and salesmanship whether they
want to or not. While similar captive audience salesmanship applied to the
crowds in Grand Central Station in New York was prohibited by state
authorities after a vigorous popular protest led by The New Yorker magazine, the District of Columbia Public Service Commission refused to forbid the practice for Capital Transit. For what relevance it has, it should
be noted that a substantial majority of Capital's passengers approved of
1°4
the programs.
Risumg. Under this year's Supreme Court decisions, Capital Transit's
passengers must listen to its radio or stay home. 05 Chin Poy's distant
friend in the Narcotics Bureau may lawfully eavesdrop by radio to hear
On Lee." 6
The trouble with the practices underlying these decisions is that in the
war between man and machine, they give all the edge to the machine.
The captive aulience bus case, of course, presents a problem hard to
solve through constitutional law. The radio broadcasting may be offensive
and a nuisance, but it is difficult to turn it into a violation of due process.
104
The facts are taken from the opinion of the Court, Public Utilities Comn'n v. Pollack,
343 U.S. 451 (1952). The preference data are based on a self-serving poll taken at the Company's behest, and the questions as set forth in the opinion seem sufficiently loaded to make
precise estimates dubious. The net effect, however, is clearly one of passenger acceptance.
10

Ibid.

16 72 S.Ct. 967 (1952).
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However, it is not impossible; the Court of Appeals of the District of
Columbia (Edgerton, Fahy, and Bazelon, JJ) found it a deprivation of a
liberty to be let alone, at least as to the commercials and the announcements. 0 1 Justice Douglas, dissenting in the Supreme Court, thought that
even on busses and streetcars, there is a right to be free of "coercion to
make people listen." He conceded that these particular programs were not
propaganda-slanted, "But the vice is inherent in the system. Once privacy
is invaded, privacy is gone. Once a man is forced to submit to one type of
08
radio program, he can be forced to submit to another."'
Justice Burton, for the majority, did not go so far as to say that the individual loses all right of privacy when he steps into a commercial vehicle;
but there is no perceptible or identifiable amount left. The right of privacy, said Justice Burton, "is substantially limited by the rights of others
when its possessor travels on a public thoroughfare or rides in a public
conveyance." The criterion for the Public Service Commission is not privacy, but "general public convenience, comfort and safety."' 09
The New Yorker, still resisting, gloomily pondered the consequences if
the next advertising stunt should be the spraying of the busses by a perfume company. Whether scent or sound, it concluded, "The franchise of
a bus company should not include the right to spray anybody with anything at all."" 0
Bus broadcasting is annoying, perhaps, but it is less serious by itself
than as a token of things to come in the direction of forced listening. Moreover, it takes highly creative and extraordinarily novel constitutional law
to do anything about it. But On Lee's case is deadly serious by itself, and
as to it there was no appreciable balance of doctrine in favor of the
majority.
The closest precedents are the Olmstead and Goldman cases."' In Olinstead, the Court, 5 to 4, upheld wiretapping as a reasonable search and
seizure. The decision evoked the famous Holmes protest against "dirty
business." In Goldman, the Court, 5 to 3, held that the attachment of a
detectaphone to the outside of a room for the purpose of magnifying
sounds within and thus eavesdropping on conversations was not substantially different from wiretapping, and therefore was permissible.
107 191

F. 2d 450 (C.A. D.C., 1951).
108 Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollack, 343 U.S. 451, 469 (1952).
109 Ibid., at 46--65.
nO 28 The New Yorker, No. 16, at 17 (June 7, 1952).
WOlmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S.
129 (1942).
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Those decisions ought to be overruled; they narrow individual privacy
to the point of disappearance. But they at least did not permit the police
to hide their gadgets on the inside of a man's home. Judge Jerome Frank,
in his comprehensive and persuasive dissent in the Court of Appeals,
readily distinguished Olmstead: "There the Court held that wiretapping
did not violate the Amendment, basing its decision in large part on the
fact that interception of the phone message involved no entry. The Court
said, 'There was no entry of the houses or offices of the defendants.' This
112
fact the Court noted five times."
In On Lee's case the Supreme Court chose to ignore that distinction,
obscuring all that is important behind the fact that, since Chin Poy was
a licensed invitee, this was not really trespass in the classic sense. But who
cares? If carrying a secret broadcasting device into a man's place of business or home is not the trespass Lord Coke had in mind, then the concept
of trespass needs to catch up with twentieth century scientific ingenuity.
Justice Black dissented on the ground that, without regard to the
search and seizure problem, such practices should not be allowed by the
Supreme Court in its capacity as supervisory authority over federal criminal justice. Justice Burton embraced the position of Judge Frank below,
getting over the trespass point with the practical observation that carrying in the transmitter amounted to surreptitiously bringing in the agent
with him. Justice Douglas dissented on the broader ground that he had
erred years before in accepting Goldman; it and Olmstead should be overruled for the "decisive factor is the invasion of privacy against the comn3
mand of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.""
Justice Frankfurter dissented in an eloquent short statement." 4 He
would not "approve legally what we disapprove morally.... The contrast between morality professed by society and immorality practiced on
its behalf makes for contempt of law." Since we first approved wiretapping, "we have gone from inefficiency to inefficiency, from corruption to
corruption." This method of law enforcement "puts a premium on force
and fraud, not on imagination and enterprise and professional training."
The great insight of Justice Frankfurter's position is its identification
of the moral vice of snooping. That vice is bad enough when it brings an
undoubtedly guilty opium peddler to book. But there is no way to confine
its use to the guilty. The disheartening aspect of Justice Burton's opinion
is its refusal to take the great social issue of privacy out of the context of
trespass and consider it in terms of human dignity.
W United States v. On Lee, 193 F. 2d 306, 312 (1951).
U3

United States v. On Lee, 72 S. Ct. 967, 977 (1952).

14 Ibid.,

at 974-76.
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Tacitus, in the Annals, de3cribes the ways of informers in the reign of
Tiberius: They did not distinguish "between kinsfolk and strangers, between friends and unknown persons, between things of yesterday and
things obscured by time. Words uttered in the street, or across the dinnertable, on any subject whatever, were noted for accusation, every man hurrying to be first to make down his victim; some few acting in self-defence,
the greater number as if infected by some contagious malady.""'
The way to stamp out prying by electricity is to make its fruits useless
and thus put some limitation on our own usage of Tiberius. Even without such gadgets, in Washington today the casual banter of cocktail
hour chatter has been known to be turned in to the authorities by guests
within twenty-four hours. If secret devices such as that used to convict On Lee are permitted, what host can know as he looks around his
own dinner table whether every word uttered is being recorded on a distant sound track? Such fears are not far-fetched. As Judge Frank's dissent
points out, this was done in Nazi Germany where secret conversations had
to be held in bathrooms because they were more difficult to tap.
(d) Immigrants.Rep. Albert Johnson, author of the Immigration Act of
1924, caught the spirit of that time in a phrase when he said, "The day of
unalloyed welcome to all peoples, the day of indiscriminate acceptance of
all races, has definitely ended.""16 In 1952, in a new McCarran Act passed
over the veto of President Truman, the Congress reaffirmed the basic
principles of Rep. Johnson's Act; but despite Rep. Johnson's vigilance, in
1952 rascals were still in our midst, and the McCarran Act took vigorous
steps to see that they did not remain.
American immigration policy since the Revolution has been a peculiar
mixture of xenophobia, or hysterical fear of strangers, and encouragement
of settlement. President Truman's veto message on the McCarran Act,
after blasting at the national origins quota system as "based upon assumptions at variance with American ideals," then turned to the effect of the
Act upon aliens already within our borders: "Our resident aliens would be
more easily separated from homes and families under grounds of deportation, both new and old, which would specifically be made retroactive. Admission to our citizenship would be made more difficult; expulsion from
our citizenship would be made easier. Certain rights of native-born, first
generation Americans would be limited.... Some of the new grounds of
deportation which the bill would provide are unnecessarily severe." Referring to the provision authorizing deportation for undefined "activities
n' 1 Ramsey, Annals of Tacitus, Book V11-4, 367 (1904).
n' Garis, Immigration Restrictions viii (1927).
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'prejudicial to the public interest,' "the President said, "These provisions
are worse than the infamous Alien Act of 1798, passed in a time of national
fear and distrust of foreigners, which gave the President power to deport
any alien deemed 'dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States.'
...

Such powers are inconsistent with our Democratic ideals.""'

Senator McCarran described the President's veto as an "un-AmericanAct" by which the President "has adopted the doctrine promulgated by
the Daily Worker." The Congress passed the bill over the President's
veto.'
During the same months that Congress was legislating, the Court was
deciding cases of vital concern to aliens. Nothing that was decided will
disturb Senator McCarran. Indeed, after the decision of the most important case of the year concerning aliens, Harisiadesv. Shaughnessy, Senator
McCarran announced that the opinion of the Court "amply justified" the
position he had been holding." 9
The two major decisions concerning aliens were the Harisiadescase and
Carlson v. Landon.' The issue in the Harisiadescase was the validity of
the provision of the Alien Registration Act of 1940 for deportation of
Communists even though party membership might have terminated before the passage of the Act. Of the group of cases presented under this
name, the most extreme was that of Mascitti, an Italian who came to this
country in 1920 at sixteen, was associated with Communist organizations
from 1923 to 1929 and has been completely dissociated from such activities since that time. He has an American wife and child. The main issues
were whether the Act denies due process, abridges freedom of speech, or
is ex post facto.
Justice Jackson, for a Court which divided six to two, upheld the Act.'
He first reaffirmed the broad power of Congress to deport aliens; their
"ambiguous status within the country is not [a] right but is a matter of
U The message is taken from N.Y. Times § 1, p. 14, col. 7 (June 26, 1952).

us Ibid.
ng 342 U.S. 580 (1952); the quotation of Senator McCarran is from N.Y. Times §1, p. 1,
col. 6 (Mar. 11, 1952).
1 0 342 U.S. 524 (1952). Minor cases concerning aliens were Jaegeler v. Carusi, 342 U.S. 347
(1952), holding that the power of the Attorney General to deport alien enemies to Germany
ended with the Joint Resolution of Congress terminating the war with Germany; Bindczyck v.
Finucane, 342 U.S. 76 (1951), holding that denaturalization proceedings must be brought in
federal courts exclusively; and United States v. Spector, 343 U.S. 169 (1952), upholding a
criminal penalty applies to aliens who have been ordered deported and fail to make timely
application for passports.
1n The quotes following are from the Jackson opinion at 342 U.S. 581, 586-87, 590, 591,
594, and the Frankfurter opinion at 597-98, 610, and the Douglas opinion at 599.
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permission and tolerance." The most the alien has is "a precarious
tenure."
This raises for the Court the question of whether there is any limitation
at all on the deportation power, whether Congress can be utterly capricious. Says the Justice, "[We] must tolerate what personally we may regard as a legislative mistake."
Justice Jackson reasons it through this way: We cannot ay that "congressional alarm about a coalition of Communist power without and Communist conspiracy within the United States is either a fantasy or a pretense." After all, the Constitution does not obstruct the draft of the soldier
who "is transported to foreign lands to stem the tide of Communism. If
Communist aggression creates such hardships for loyal citizens, it is hard
to find justification for holding that ...its hardships must be spared the
Communist alien."
This, I submit, is not argument. It is the substitution of a red, white and
blue hair shirt for the traditional judicial costume. The issue is not whether the United States has power to fight Communism with all its might, nor
whether aliens shall be coddled while citizens bleed. The issue is whether
an alien who stopped being a Communist as soon as he reached maturity,
and that many years ago, can be deported. It sheds no light on that question to weep over the Flag.
But the issue, the Court suggests, is not judicial, it is political. Justice
Frankfurter, concurring, says, "whether immigration laws have been
crude and cruel, whether they may have reflected xenophobia in general
or anti-Semitism or anti-Catholicism, the responsibility belongs to Congress.... [Tihe place to resist unwise or cruel legislation touching aliens
is the Congress, not this Court."
Justice Douglas, dissenting, joined by Justice Black, would overrule the
1893 decision which gave to Congress these awesome powers over aliens.
Under the decisions, aliens are entitled to due process in relation to the
minor regulations of their lives or their businesses; they are entitled to fair
trial, to habeas corpus, to equal rights of employment. "If those rights,
great as they are, have constitutional protection, I think the more important one-the right to remain here-has a like dignity." The dissent concedes that Congress has some right to uproot aliens and break up their
families, but this should be done only on an actual showing of their menace. Here Congress "has ordered these aliens deported not for what they
are but for what they once were. Perhaps a hearing would show that they
of
continue to be people dangerous and hostile to us. But the principle
philosophy
our
forgiveness and the doctrine of redemption are too deep in
to admit that there is no return for those who have once erred."
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Justice Jackson's opinion also touches the two remaining points. As for
the argument that the statute denies the aliens free speech by precluding
their membership in political parties others may still join, the matter is
decided against the alien by the Dennis case upholding the conviction of
the Communist leaders. As for the argument that the law is ex post facto,
punishing conduct that was not illegal when committed, there is a simple
answer. The ex post facto clause applies only to criminal penalties. As Mr.
Mascitti says good-bye to his home, his family, his job, and returns to
take up his life again in an Italy he has not been in since he left it as a boy
thirty-two years ago, he will have the comfort of knowing that he has been
convicted of no crime. As Justice Jackson says, "Deportation, however
severe its consequences, has been consistently classified as a civil rather
than a criminal procedure."
In Carlson v. Landon,12 the issue was whether the Attorney General
might cause to be held without bail, at his own discretion, aliens charged
with being Communists. The case is dramatized by the fact that at the
same Term, in Stack v. Boyle,12 the Court held that citizens charged under
the criminal law with offenses as Communists were entitled to bail on the
same basis as all other persons accused of crime.
The result of the two cases put together is that citizens charged with
Communism as a substantive crime are entitled to bail until they are
proven guilty. Aliens, caught up in the "civil proceedings" of deportation
are not entitled to bail until they are proven guilty. Since the Attorney
General obviously can not personally pass on all these cases, the practical
effect is that the Immigration Service can, at its own discretion, put aliens
in jail indefinitely. The sole limitation is the case of "clear abuse," a
standard which will rarely be met.
The substantial question in the case is whether elimination of bail violates the mandate of the Eighth Amendment, "Excessive bail shall not be
required.. . ." Justice Reed 2 4 for the Court disposes of the point neatly.
The Eighth Amendment provides only that bail shall not be excessive
where there is bail. It is one thing to say that bail may not be too high, and
quite another to say that it may not be refused altogether. As Justice
Burton replied in dissent, "The Amendment cannot well mean that, on the
one hand, it prohibits the requirement of bail so excessive in amount as
to be unattainable, yet, on the other hand, under like circumstances it
does not prohibit the denial of bail, which comes to the same thing."
The decision was five to four, and there were additional separate dissents by Justices Black, Frankfurter, and Douglas.
- 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
124The

"'

342 U.S. 1 (1951).

discussion by justice Reed is at 342 U.S. 544; that by Justice Burton, ibid., at 569.
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Justice Black described the denial of bail as "shocking," and likely to
amount to a life sentence for a mere charge, particularly for one elderly
petitioner and for another whose health was bad and whose case had already been in leisurely bureaucratic and court proceedings for four years.
He stressed the case of one petitioner, Zydok, in this country for thirtynine years, who had five grandchildren, whose sons were in the army, and
who himself, while working as a waiter, sold $50,000 worth of war bonds
and donated blood seven times during World War II. He thought it a
denial of due process to deny bail to persons concerning whom there was
not even a suspicion that they might leave the jurisdiction. As for the
Court's reading of the Eighth Amendment, it could be given "this weird,
devitalizing interpretation" only "when scrutinized with a hostile eye."
Justice Frankfurter most persuasively argued that the practice of making
was not authorized by the statute claimed to supaliens "unbailable"
15
port it."
(e) Race Relations. The only significant race relations decision of the
year was Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard,126 pushing a step farther the doctrine that the Brotherhoods could not expect to be exclusive
bargaining agents for their Negro members if the brotherhoods themselves were going to discriminate against the Negroes because of race.
Of highest interest is a matter on the horizon for the 1952 term.
Throughout the year the Court engaged in the most remarkable process
of delay of consideration of two cases challenging grade school segregation,
one from Kansas and the other from South Carolina. After holding the
South Carolina petition for certiorari on its docket for months, the Court
sent it back to the trial court for almost superfluous further proceedings,
from which it quickly returned, and the Kansas case was allowed to lie
unnoticed on the docket all year. At the end of term, both cases were ac12 7
cepted for argument in the Fall.

The most likely explanation of this highly unusual procedure is that the
Court wished to avoid consideration of so inflammable a topic in an elec15 The Black dissent is at 342 U.S. 547; that of Justice Frankfurter, ibid., at 558.
1w 72 S. Ct. 1022 (1952).
2
7 The South Carolina case, Briggs v. Elliot, 342 U.S. 350 (1952), was appealed by the Negroes involved because the order of the trial court provided only that the school facilities should
be equalized, rather than that segregation was unconstitutional per se. The Court remanded
the case for further consideration of a report filed in the trial court on the factual issue of segregation, a report the trial court would not have had if the Supreme Court had not delayed action
four months and, moreover, a report which was irrelevant to the only issue on which the appellants sought review. Justices Black and Douglas, noting the irrelevancy, thought the case
should be set for argument at once. On the last day of the term, the Court did grant a new
appeal from the consideration of that report, 72 S. Ct. 1078 (1952). The appeal was followed in
the Kansas case at the same time, Brown v. Board of Education, 72 S. Ct. 1070 (1952).
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tion year. The Court's decision of Morgan v. Virginia12 became an issue
in the election of 1948 which helped unseat Governor Arnall in Georgia
and send Governor Talmadge into office. The decision of Sweatt v. Painter 29 between the first and second primaries in North Carolina in 1950 was
undoubtedly the factor which unseated liberal Senator Frank Graham of
that state and sent Willis Smith to the Senate. The Court can scarcely be
blamed if it wants to insure that the decision of this question should be
unencumbered by thoughts about November, 1952.
(f) Contempt. On October 13th, 1949, as reported by Life Magazine a
few days later, Judge Harold Medina, at the end of the great Communist
trial, sternly "called the Communists' lawyers before him and, as the
courtroom gasped, gave six of them sentences varying from 30 days to six
months in jail for contempt of court. Judge Medina's frown gave way to a
look of sober satisfaction as he turned, his black robes swirling softly, and
then proceeded from the courtroom."' 13 0
On March 10th, 1952, one may suspect that Judge Medina's look was
equally sober, but less satisfied. On that day the Supreme Court upheld
his contempt sentences. 131 The five majority Justices saw in the issue
which had survived the lower court proceedings only a narrow procedural
question which they disposed of without passing on the Judge's own conduct. The three minority Justices, seeing in the case a necessity to consider that conduct, proceeded to give Judge Medina what may well be the
most severe scolding for judicial misbehavior ever given a lower federal
judge by a bloc of Supreme Court Justices. The rebuke was all the more
striking because its most comprehensive statement was by Justice Frankfurter, noted for his almost extreme courtesy to the lower federal bench.
The eleven month trial had been remarkable throughout. It came to
Judge Medina at a time when, after a brilliant career as a teacher, a courtroom lawyer, and as the outstanding cram-course lecturer in the country,
he was still a most inexperienced judge. His professional career had seen
the growth of an irrepressible oral ability which he had tamed only within the confines of lecturer and advocate. The judicial art of listening was
foreign to him, and as the long trial progressed, it proved to be unavailable. The record fully supports the conclusion of Justice Frankfurter that
Judge Medina allowed his courtroom to become "an undisciplined debating society ....

Too often counsel were encouraged to vie with the court

in dialectic, in repartee and banter, in talk so copious as inevitably to
-,S 328 U.S. 373 (1946).
-9 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
110 27 Life, No. 17, at 31 (Oct. 24, 1949).
13, Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952).
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arrest the momentum of the trial and to weaken the restraints of respect
that a judge should engenderin lawyers.... He indulged them, sometimes resignedly, sometimes playfully, in lengthy speeches... incontinent wrangles between court and counsel.'1

2

The proceedings in this most difficult case were further complicated by
the Judge's almost morbid preoccupation with his physical well-being. 3
As Justice Frankfurter said, "His self-concern pervades the record." It
was further complicated by a sense of religious mission which might to
some equally religious men seem blasphemous.
In an article on his religious experience in relation to contempt of
court,"14 the Judge described the divine guidance which came to him when
he was "singled out to uphold American justice in an evil crisis." He
quickly gained a "solemn feeling" that his courtroom rulings were "part
of a universal fabric, part and parcel of moral law, divine in origin." In
a crisis, "Someone else had showed me what to do."
This personal sense of divine guidance gave the judge an assurance and
strength adequate to surmount the perils of his martyrdom. In one crisis
of the trial, weary, he lay down and "asked God to take charge of things
and that His will be done.... That brief period of communion with my
Maker saved my life and saved the trial." At times as he smote those who
strove against him, one senses that the power of an Avenging Angel
gripped his arm. As he puts it, when he gave his first contempt sentence
during the trial, "If ever a man felt the presence of Someone else beside
him, strengthening his will and giving him aid and comfort, it was I on
that day."
The legal issues which survived this manifestation of the divine will did
not include the question of whether the lawyers were, in fact, in contempt.
There is scarcely room for doubt that they were, some of them grossly so.
Judge Charles Clark, dissenting in the Court of Appeals, conceded that
their conduct was "abominable.""15 None of the Supreme Court attempted
to defend their total behavior, which, taken by itself, the record shows to
have been indefensible. The large factual issue remaining was whether
that conduct could be viewed by itself, or whether counsel's behavior was
112Ibid., at 38. The Frankfurter opinion from which various quotes are taken is ibid., at
23-42, and the Appendix is ibid., at 42-89.
11'See, e.g., Alexander, Ordeal of Judge Medina, 223 Sat. Evening Post 17 (Aug. 12, 1950);
Daniel, Judge Medina 232-33 (1952).
13
4Medina, Someone Else on the Bench, 59 Reader's Digest 16 (August, 1951).
135Judge Clark continues: "Yet such naturaletlionalreaction does not of itself prove that
they should be imprisoned without a hearing weeks or months after the events." (Emphasis
added.) 182 F. 2d 416, 463 (CA. 2d, 1950).
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an inevitable response to judicial goading. As stated succinctly by Justice
Douglas, the issue was "whether members of the bar conspired to drive a
judge from the bench or whether the judge used the authority of the bench
to whipsaw the lawyers, to taunt and tempt them, and to create for himself the role of the persecuted." '
That factual issue permeated these legal questions:
First, whether Federal Criminal Rule 42 required Judge Medina either
to give the attorneys a hearing himself or to refer the contempt matter to
another judge for hearing and sentencing.
Second, whether the conduct of Judge Medina exhibited such extreme
bias and eccentricity that as a matter of sound supervision of the federal
courts, the sentences should not be allowed to stand.
Third, whether the blending of a general conspiracy charge against the
lawyers by Judge Medina with his specific charges of misdeeds required a
reversal.
To dispose of the third question first, Judge Medina, as he has said off
the record, early came to the conclusion that the Communists were trying
37
"to wear me down until I lost my self control and occasioned a mistrial.'
When, at the end of the trial, therefore, Judge Medina handed down his
sentences, he did so on forty counts. The last thirty-nine were specific misdeeds occurring in the courtroom. The first was a general conspiracy
charge of systematic disruption of the trial. The whole was prefaced by a
statement in which he said that he would have been inclined to overlook
many of the misdeeds except that he found there had been "an agreement
between these defendants, deliberately entered into in a cold and calculating manner" to make the trial impossible, force a mistrial, and ruin
the Judge's health. 13
If such an agreement existed, it was of course contemptuous. But under
Rule 42(a)," 9 a judge may give a summary contempt sentence only for
contempt which he "saw or heard," which is "committed in the actual
presence of the court." All out of court contempt is subject to Rule 42(b)
which requires, at a minimum, notice and hearing, and may require transfer to another judge. In this case the conspiracy, assuming as may well be
true that it existed, obviously occurred out of court. Hence the Court of
Appeals (Judge Frank on this issue joining Judge Clark who dissented on
the whole case) reversed on the conspiracy count, and that conclusion was
not reviewed by the Supreme Court.
13 Reader's Digest, op. cit. supra note 134.
W343 U.S. 1, 89 (1952).
us 182 F. 2d 416, 430 (C.A. 2d, 1950). The contempt certificate is set out ibid., at 430-53.
139 Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 42(a) and rules following.
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Nonetheless the Court of Appeals (Judge Clark dissenting as to this)
held that since the sentences on all counts were concurrent, the reversal
on the conspiracy count was immaterial. The Supreme Court affirmed this
ruling. This, while undoubtedly permissible under the technical rule as to
concurrent sentences,'140 was on the facts most unjust since, by his own
statement, the severity of Judge Medina's sentences was obviously the
product of his decision on the very point on which he was overruled. This
is particularly apparent in the case of McCabe, who received a thirty day
sentence. Apart from the conspiracy, if any, there were five counts against
McCabe for misdeeds in an eleven month trial. While they undoubtedly
show contempt, a severe rebuke or a small money fine would have been
141
more than adequate punishment.
Turning to the issue of the interpretation of Rule 42(a), the only matter
considered by the majority, the question is narrow. Rule 42(a) permits
summary punishment, without charge, notice, or hearing, by the judge
against whom the contempt is committed, if it is committed in open court.
Rule 42(b) requires notice and hearing for all other contempts and, where
the contempt involves "disrespect to or criticism of a judge," requires that
another judge shall hear the case.
Conceivably contempt in open court might be punished (a) by the
judge then and there, at the moment of contempt, announcing the punishment and immediately enforcing it; (b) by the judge postponing the
announcement for a short period of calm and contemplation, and then enforcing it; (c) by the judge either immediately or soon after the episode
announcing guilt, but suspending either the sentence or its enforcement
until the end of trial; or (d) by the judge waiting until the end of trial both
140

The cases are collected by Judge Frank, 182 F. 2d 416, 456 n. 6 (C.A. 2d, 1950).
The case against McCabe, as set out by judge Medina in the contempt certificate, 182
F. 2d at 434, 435, 436, 444-45 is this: (1) On February 4, 1949, McCabe uttered a sentence
which included the phrase that something the judge had said "may very well be addressed to
some one outside the courtroom." (2) On the same day, some of the lawyers persisted overly in
arguing a point. The sole allusion to McCabe in this count is that "The Court told Mr. McCabe
that argument was unnecessary." Mr. McCabe apparently thereupon desisted, though two of
the other lawyers did not. (3) On January 17th, 1949, the Court observed that counsel were
conducting the case in a way "he never thought he would see in a court of justice." Up to this
point, so far as the citation shows, McCabe had not been involved; but McCabe then said
"in a sarcastic tone," "I will agree, your Honor, on that last point; the way this case has been
conducted is one which I certainly hoped that I would never see in a court of justice." The
Court responded, "You mean the way it has been conducted by me, I take it." McCabe: "I
mean that exactly." (4) On February 18th, 1949, McCabe [in his one apparently premeditated
contempt; JPF] asserted that the Judge was timing his statements from the bench to make
the newspapers. (5) On June 3d, some of the defendants (not McCabe) were disorderly. None
of the lawyers, including McCabe "made any attempt to assist the Court in restoring order."
All of McCabe's charged acts of contempt except the completely negative No. 5 were at
least six months before sentence.
11
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to announce guilt (though making threats occasionally) and to assess and
enforce the penalty. In the West Coast Communist cases, the judges used
devices (b) and (c).142 Judge Medina used (d).
Thus in this case, the actual determination of guilt and the sentence
came months after the episodes which occasioned them. This, claimed the
lawyers, was not "summary punishment," the only kind of punishment
permitted by Rule 42(a), and therefore the case must fall under Rule
42(b). The Supreme Court's majority held, to the contrary, that the trial
judge "if he believes the exigencies of the trial require" may "defer judgment until its completion." Justice Frankfurter's dissenting position in
essence was that, since immediate punishment obviously was not necessary to the completion of the trial, which finished without it, and since the
contempts were of a sort dominantly personal to Judge Medina, the case
should be tried by another judge under Rule 42(b).
This leaves the question of whether, in fact, judge Medina's conduct of
the trial was such that the parties and the Judge were, if one may borrow a
conception from tort law, in pari delicto. On this the majority expressed
no opinion. Justice Black found that judge Medina showed "such bitter
hostility to the lawyers that the accuser should be held disqualified to try
them."'14 3 In one instance he found that "Candor compels me to say that
in this episode the decorum and dignity of the lawyer who had just been
sent to prison loses nothing by comparison with" that of the judge. justices Douglas and Frankfurter have been quoted above. But the crowning
evidence of the Judge's own responsibility is an extensive appendix to
Justice Frankfurter's opinion consisting of quotations from the record
which will leave most lawyer readers with an uncomfortable, embarrassed
sense that the endless, superfluous talk which stretched out the Communist case was by no means all from the front of the Bench.'
(g) CriminalProcedure.About ten per cent of the cases of the Term involved forced confessions, the right to counsel, and searches and seizures.
The principal accomplishment of the year in these areas was Jennings
14

The cases are discussed by Justice Frankfurter at 343 U.S. 1, 39-40 (1952).

Ibid., at 15, 17. Justice Black also discussed the constitutional validity of contempt
143
sentences without jury trial.
144 It is interesting to note that the current New York and Los Angeles Communist trials
are proceeding with smooth efficiency and are running into none of the snags that blocked the
first case. This may be in part because Judge Medina blazed the way, in part because more discreet counsel are involved in the present cases. However, observers who were in the courtroom
in the first case, and who have first-hand information about the current cases, report that the
principal difference is in the orderly, unobtrusive, efficient and quiet way Judge Dimock (New
York) and Judge Mathes (Los Angeles) run their courtrooms.
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which seems, if optimism may be permitted where hope has
so often been blighted before, to put an end to the Illinois post-conviction
procedural tangle. Under familiar principles, prisoners in Illinois as in all
other state penitentiaries are entitled to challenge their convictions collaterally if they were denied constitutional rights at their original trials,
at least in the absence of waiver. Under equally familiar principles, they
must exhaust the state remedy of collateral attack before they may have
recourse to the federal district court.
For almost ten years the Supreme Court has been mired in an impossible effort to discover what the Illinois state remedy was, so that it might
be known whether it had been exhausted. Finally, under the goading of
the sizzling opinion of justice Rutledge in Marinov. Ragen,146 in which he
denounced the Illinois procedure as a series of blind alleys, and under the
pressures of the bar, the press, and the law schools14 of the state, Illinois
passed a post-conviction hearing act which promised to give a plain,
speedy, and adequate state remedy. Unfortunately, the state courts
seemed in the prospect of giving that remedial statute an extremely narrow interpretation which would have re-created the very situation it was
48
intended to remedy.
The matter came to a head this year in the Jennings case. Iere, in a
group of three cases, each petitioner, now an inmate of an Illinois penitentiary, claimed to have been imprisoned on a forced confession. Each raised
the issue that he had been unable to appeal his original conviction because
he was a pauper, and each filed a collateral petition for review under the
Illinois post-conviction hearing act. The trial courts denied the petitions of
each without consideration of the merits of their claims. In each, the Illinois Supreme Court, as it had in twenty-five cases preceding this which
had reached the United States Supreme Court, entered form orders dismissing the appeals as insubstantial.
Chief Justice Vinson, in the reversing opinion, conceded that a violation of constitutional rights might, under appropriate circumstances, be
waived by failure to appeal an original conviction; but he held that a
right of appeal conditioned upon the possession of money which the
petitioners did not have amounted to no right of appeal at all. Since the
M 342 U.S. 104 (1951).
'- 332 U.S. 561 (1947); see also the significant opinion of the Chief Justice in this series,
Young v. Ragen, 337 U.S. 235 (1949).
147 E.g. Katz, An Open Letter to the Attorney General of Illinois, 15 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 251
(1948).
I Smith-Hurd 1ll. Ann. Stat. (1951), c. 38, Supp. p. 235.
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Illinois Attorney General asserted that the post-conviction hearing act
was not appropriate for raising petitioners' questions, there appeared to
be no state remedy. He thereupon remanded the case with instructions
in the alternative. Either the state Supreme Court was to specify exactly
how petitioners' claims could be raised under the Illinois Statute, or
"petitioners may proceed without more in the United States District
Court."
That did it. On remand, the Illinois Supreme Court filed a comprehensive opinion interpreting the state act to give a model review procedure. 1 49
If Illinois sticks to the blueprint laid down in this opinion, its post-conviction procedures will have moved from about the worst to as good as the
best in the country. Whether they will work out that way remains to be
seen.
In the field of forced confessions, the Court unanimously in result,
though by different routes, held that the police could not use a stomach
pump to make a defendant disgorge evidence. Justice Frankfurter, for the
majority, reached the result because stomach pumping shocked his conscience and therefore denied due process. justices Black and Douglas,
without consulting their consciences, thought it enough that such evidence
was self-incriminatory. 150
(h) Summary of Civil Rights Positions.A summary of the positions of
the Justices in the divided civil rights cases follows. As always, such data
must be read with the greatest care, for they may be misleading. This
year, for example, one of the most important civil rights cases, that concerning movie censorship, was unanimous and therefore is not included
here. Again, no numerical presentation can make allowance for intensity,
or extremes of view. For example Justice Jackson's lone desire to overrule
all the cases which have declared that the Fourteenth Amendment makes
the First Amendment a specific limitation on the states' is obviously
more significant than some individual vote on the facts of a particular confession case.
People v. Jennings, 411 Ill. 21, 102 N.E. 2d 824 (1952).
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). The various opinions discuss the "conscience
test." Another forced confession case was Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952), in which
the confession was held not forced. Defendant, who had committed a particularly horrible
murder of a small child, appears to have had the minimum amount of roughing up that can
be expected from any police short of demi-gods. In Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951),
the Court dealt with a most unusual situation in which the confession was forced, if at all, by
one state, and the conviction occurred in another.
Miscellaneous search and seizure cases were United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951);
the On Lee case, discussed at length above in connection with privacy; and Stefanelli v.
149
150

Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951).
u' Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 287 (1952).
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When all the necessary qualifications are made, this table nonetheless
has substantial residual value. If a given Justice's decisions put him preponderantly in one column or the other, then the figures contain a clue as
to his basic attitudes about civil rights. For example, Justice Minton is the
first Justice in the six years that these tables have been accumulated to
vote against the claimed right in every divided case in which he participated. At a minimum, one may deduce from this that Justice Minton
places civil rights lower than many other values on his own scale.
TABLE 1
DISTRIBUTION OF VOTES IN NONUNANIMOUS CIVIL RIGHTS CASES, 1946-1951
Ix SUPPORT OF CzI.IEO RIGHT
Percentage
1946-50 1946-51 of Total

Vinson ........

Black ..........
Reed ..........
Frankfurter ....
Douglas .......
Jackson ........
Burton ........
Clark ..........
Minton ........

13
66
14
43
63
23
20
4
5

16
84
17
57
79
30
27
9
5

15
79
16
53
83
28
25
26
11

Iu DENIAL OF CLA= RIGHT
Percentage

1951

1946-50

1946-51

of Total

17
2
17
5
4
13
13
12
16

74
21
74
45
12
63
68
14
26

91
23
91
50
16
76'
81
26
42

85
21
84
47
17
72
75
74
89

TABLE 2
DISTRIBUTION OF VOTES IN NONUNANIMOUS
CIVIL RIGHTS CASES, 1949-1951
IN SUPPORT OP
IN DMasIL OF
CLAi=

RIGHT

Cri.ri

Percentage

Vinson ..........
Black ............
Reed ............
Frankfurter ......
Douglas .........
Jackson ..........
Burton ..........
Clark ............
Minton ..........

1949-51

of Total

8
45
9
34
32
16
17
9
5

16
88
18
68
84
31
33
26
11

RIGHT

Percentage

1949-51 of Total
42
6
42
16
6
35
34
26
42

84
12
82
32
16
69
67
74
89

There were twenty divided civil rights cases at the 1951 term. 2 Disqualifications result in some Justices having less than that number. The
2 Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952); Brotherhood R.R. Trainmen v.
Howard, 72 S. Ct. 1022 (1952); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952); Boyce Motor
Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337 (1952); United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36 (1951),
treated as a divided case on the McNabb point; Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952);
Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952);
United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951); Jennings v. Illinois, 342 U.S. 104 (1951); Keenan
v. Burke, 342 U.S. 881 (1951); On Lee v. United States, 72 S. Ct. 967 (1952); Leland v. Oregon,
72 S. Ct. 1002 (1952); Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U.S. 134 (1951); Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollack,
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same data, presented separately for the 1949-51 terms only, makes dearer
the relationship of justices Clark and Minton to the rest of the Court.
IV. LAWYER,'S LAW
(a) Jurisdiction,procedure,and related subjects. Jurisdictional case of the
year and a matter of major importance was Madsen v. Kinsella,'53 upholding the validity of the American court system in Germany.
The case arose when Yvette J. Madsen, an American citizen, murdered
her husband, an American Airforce Lieutenant, near Frankfort. After her
arrest by military police, if she was to be tried by any American court in
Germany at all, the alternatives were a court martial or a "United States
Court of the Allied High Commission." She was tried by the latter, a
court with American civilian judges which applied German law. The procedure of such courts is a peculiar merger of military and civil practice,
and accords to the defendant some but not all of the constitutional guarantees of the Bill of Rights. For example, there is no jury: Convicted in this
court, she appealed to a higher Commission Court and upon affirmance of
her conviction was imprisoned in a United States prison in West Vir154
ginia.
The principal questions in the case, covered in a handsome opinion by
Justice Burton, were: First, whether as between courts martial and the
Commission courts, the latter had jurisdiction to try the case; second,
whether, assuming that such Commission courts might under some circumstances be appropriate, they retained jurisdiction after the occupation
passed to civil authorities; and third, whether such a system of courts
could be established by Presidential edict, as these were, without statutory basis. There was also a trifling question as to whether, assuming the
validity of the court system, the particular offense and defendant were
within its jurisdiction. It was readily shown that they were.
The real problem in the case lies in the fact that post-World War II occupations by American troops were a new phenomenon in American ex343 U.S. 451 (1952); Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952); United States v. Spector, 343
U.S. 169 (1952); Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951); Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181
(1952); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). Justice Jackson's vote in the Beauharnais case
is treated as against the claimed right, since it is so on the dominant matter under discussion.
In addition, the following civil rights cases were (in result) unanimous: Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson,
343 U.S. 495 (1952); Frisbie v. Collins, 343 U.S. 519 (1952); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165 (1952); Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
153343 U.S. 341 (1952).
1 As a result there was no problem of whether any American court had jurisdiction to review a conviction abroad, as in Ahrens v. Clark, 333 U.S. 826 (1947), and Eisentrager v. Johnson, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
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perience, and the precedents could not be expected to have a clean fit. Occupation is of course not new; the Civil and Spanish American War experiences were in point. But never before had a vast system of mixed civil
and military courts been established for so many people for so long a time.
Such genius as there is to this new system was in the effort to make it
"Civilian" and as indigenous to German legal tradition as possible. The
danger was that this very effort to make the system more palatable might
overthrow it.s'

Here, Mrs. Madsen, on the rational theory that she could not do
worse than be convicted again, staked her case on the claim that she
should have been tried by a genuine court martial. The government contended that the occupation courts were in the nature of military commissions and that the jurisdiction of such commissions was concurrent with
courts martial.
Under the Articles of War, a court martial would have had jurisdiction
to try Mrs. Madsen. But under Article 15, their jurisdiction is explicitly
made concurrent with that of "military commissions, provost courts, or
other military tribunals" if the offenders or offenses "by the law of war
may be lawfully triable by such military" tribunals.
This brings the case to its hard point, and here the argument is a little
thin, as innovation is wont to be. To come within the exception of Article
15, the Commission courts must be metamorphosed into "military commissions... or other military tribunals." This takes doing, particularly
since Mrs. Madsen's offense occurred after the Occupation Statute of 1949
when Germany was under control of a civilian High Commissioner reporting to the State Department, the judges were all civilians, and even the
word "military" had been carefully stripped from the name of the tribunal. Assuming, arguendo, that such a phenomenon as a "nonmilitary"
American court can exist in any occupied territory, it is hard to imagine
how any could be less military than this.
Nonetheless the Court's practical alternatives were either to approve
the system used or upset every conviction for years and compel the use of
a hierarchy of genuinely military tribunals. Faced with that alternative,
Justice Burton turned the occupation courts into courts "in the nature of
military commissions" by sheer ipse dixit. True, the government was no
longer military, but "it was a government prescribed by an occupying
" For description, bibliography and extended discussion of the constitutional problems
involved, see Fairman, Some New Problems of the Constitution Following the Flag, 1 Stanford L. Rev. 587, particularly, 616-45 (1949). The discussion there is so full that the text above
will consider only the statutory point.
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power and it depended upon the continuing military occupancy of the
territory."' 56 There is literally no reasoning at all but the sentence quoted
to explain just why these courts were in the nature of military commissions.
This of course assumes the other point in issue, whether the President
had power to create such courts. He obviously has the power to create military commissions, and if these are military commissions, then it follows
automatically that his power is adequate to establish them. But Justice
Burton was careful to protect the power of Congress to take the matter
over: "The policy of Congress to refrain from legislating in this uncharted
area does not imply its lack of power to legislate."
Justice Black dissented: "I think that if American citizens in presentday Germany are to be tried by the American government, they should be
tried under laws passed by Congress and in courts created by Congress
57
under its constitutional authority."'
While this is essentially decision by brute force rather than by reason
or precedent, such is the nature of seminal decisions. So were the decisions
bringing corporations within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment, or establishing substantive due process, or extending the Fourteenth
Amendment to cover freedom of speech. 58 There would have been no
profit in holding that the democratic tradition required the use of a less
democratic court system in Germany than in fact was used, and this is the
only practical choice if one were to say that only genuine courts martial
could try these cases.
Two domestic jurisdictional decisions may have some significance. In
Doremuns v. Board of Education,59
' petitioners, who were respectively the
parents of a school child and taxpayers, brought suit in a New Jersey state
court to invalidate the New Jersey statute under which school begins with
the reading of five verses of the Old Testament. The New Jersey courts,
though dubious, accepted the standing of petitioners to raise the question.
The Supreme Court directed argument on the question of jurisdiction, its
attitude being reflected by Justice Jackson in an observation during oral
argument, "We won't have anything but religious questions, if we don't
166Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 357 (1952).
15
Ibid., at 372.
15 The cases are Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886) (one
sentence on the critical point and no opinion at all); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898) (beginning utility rate review with three paragraphs of assumptions); Gitlow v. New York, 268
U.S. 652 (1925) (one sentence on the critical point).
-9 342 U.S. 429 (1952).
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watch out." Meanwhile the claim of the parent became moot since the
child graduated from the school system; and the Court, in an opinion by
justice Jackson, held that it could not review the matter for want of a
case or controversy since the taxpayer's suit was not a "good faith pocketbook action."
Under Massachusettsv. Mellon, 6 ' a federal law could not be challenged
on a taxpayer's suit; but that case clearly reserved the power of the Supreme Court to review cases involving a state statute and a state general
taxpayer arising from those states which have an opposite rule. So far as
is known, Doremus is the first case in which a taxpayer's action treated as
giving rise to a justifiable controversy for state purposes has been found
inadequate for federal purposes. The Massachusetts v. Mellon rule has
worked perfectly satisfactorily both in its barring of federal and its permitting of state taxpayer suits, and there is no good reason to limit it.
However the Doremus case can perhaps be taken as a sport, peculiar to
its facts. The New Jersey court was so obviously anxious to uphold its law
that it virtually waived the jurisdictional defense in so many words, and
almost overtly gave a purely advisory opinion. In the New York release
time case, the Court distinguished Doremus because "appellants here are
parents of children currently attending schools subject to the released
time program," with no discussion at all of financial interests36 ' This suggests that if the New Jersey case had been brought by a parent whose
child would stay in the school system long enough to outlast the litigation,
the identical issue could thus be raised.
Further evidence that Doremus was not intended to be a substantial
jurisdictional innovation is found in the Adler case, 62 upholding New
York's Feinberg Law and decided on the same day as Doremus. The Adler
case was a declaratory judgment proceeding, the plaintiffs surviving to the
Supreme Court being eight municipal taxpayers suing to enjoin waste of
funds by an unconstitutional program. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting
alone on this point, claimed Doremus as authority and asserted that the
Adler case too was not a "pocketbook action" and had no real relation to
New York city taxes. Adler was a standard taxpayer's suit, the interest
of the taxpayer in fact being almost always negligible. The majority did
not bother to answer the Frankfurter dissent, assuming its jurisdiction
without discussion. So long as typical parents cases, like the release time
160262 U.S. 447

(1923).

1n Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 311 n. 6 (1952).
"

Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S, 485 (1952).
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case, and typical taxpayers cases, like Adler, may be brought, Doremus
does not substantially cut down traditional jurisdiction.
The one serious jurisdictional innovation of the year, so serious if
taken at face value that the impulse is strong to suppose that not so much
was intended, is Stembridge v. Georgia.113The facts are complex and peculiar. Petitioner was convicted of manslaughter in a Georgia trial court, his
conviction was affirmed by the state intermediate court (the Court of Appeals) and certiorari was denied by the state Supreme Court. Subsequently petitioner filed a motion for new trial in the trial court, which was denied. This denial was affirmed by the intermediate court. Petitioner then,
for the first time, in a motion for rehearing in the intermediate court
raised federal constitutional objections to his conviction. This motion was
denied on July 17, 1951. On September 12, 1951, the state Supreme Court
denied certiorari.
On October 22, 1951, petitioner obtained from the intermediate court
an amendment of the record which said in so many words, "this court considered the constitutional question [petitioner] raised and decided it
against the contentions of the" petitioner. Petitioner did not seek a similar
statement from the Supreme Court of Georgia.
The United States Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Minton,
thereupon dismissed the petition on the ground that the state decision
might have rested on adequate state grounds. The discussion, after the
statement of facts, is only a half dozen sentences, beginning "It is apparent from the record that the Supreme Court of Georgia took no action
upon the question of federal constitutional rights raised for the first time
1 64
on the motion for rehearing in the Court of Appeals."'
But this could not possibly be "apparent" from the record. All that is
in the record from the Supreme Court of Georgia is two denials of certiorari. The second was a denial after decision by the intermediate court
which, by its own statement, did pass on the federal question. The most
that could possibly be "apparent" from the record is that the state Supreme Court either might or might not have done the same thing.
True, as Justice Minton says, normal Georgia practice requires that
constitutional questions first be raised at the trial level, and therefore one
may speculate that the state Supreme Court did not pass on the question.
But this is pure speculation, for the same rule is equally applicable to the
intermediate court, and it did pass on the federal question.
Then comes the next step in the argument. "Where the highest court
163
343 U.S. 541 (1952).
164Ibid.,

at 547.
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of the state delivers no opinion and it appears that the judgment might
have rested upon a nonfederal ground, this Court will not take jurisdiction
to review the judgment.... We are without jurisdiction when the question of the existence of an adequate state ground is debatable. 65
But these propositions by no means require, or even indicate, dismissal
of a petition. Standard operating procedure when it is debatable whether
a decision rests on an adequate state ground is to return it to the state
court to find out. In the Jennings case,'66 discussed above, involving the
Illinois post-conviction procedures, the court did exactly that at this very
term after discussion of the merits. In Dixon v. Duffy, 167 a case also at this
term and which also raised questions of the validity of criminal procedure,
there was no opinion by the state Supreme Court. The order of the United
States Supreme Court read, "continued for such period as will enable
counsel for petitioner to secure a determination from the Supreme Court
of California as to whether the judgment herein was intended to rest on
an adequate independent ground." In Palmer Oil Corp. v. Amerada
Petrol. Corp.,168 also at this term, the case was first continued to permit
determination of whether the decision below was on an adequate state
ground, and was subsequently disposed of after the information had been
obtained.
Justices Black, Franikfurter, and Burton dissented from the dismissal in
the Stembridge case. Justice Reed went along with the Court, though with
apparent qualms on the jurisdictional point. The Stembridge practice of
dismissing the petition where the existence of a federal question is "debatable" cannot be squared with the Jennings, Dixon, and Palmer Oil
practice of remanding or continuing the case for determination of that
very point. If the Stembridge practice becomes general, it will serve as an
easy device for state courts to evade Supreme Court review by abstaining
from writing opinions. It is always easy to dream up some adequate state
ground the existence of which is "debatable."
(b) Fullfaithand credit.The conflicts cases of the year moved on readily
predictable lines. One divorce case holds the now familiar ground that
State A may set aside a divorce obtained in State B only on a showing that
the parties had not been served or had not participated in the proceedings
in State B.169 A second divorce case, with an unusually intricate fact situ1

"Ibid., at 547-48. (Emphasis added.)
JJennings v. Illinois, 342 U.S. 104 (1951).

167 342 U.S. 33, 34 (1951).
Is342

U.S. 35 (1951).

"I9Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126 (1951).
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ation, was neatly dispatched by Justice Reed. 7 ' In it, plaintiff got an
Illinois divorce from defendant, including an alimony obligation by defendant "for so long as plaintiff shall remain unmarried." Plaintiff did remarry, but this marriage was later validly annulled in New York on the
ground that her second spouse was already married. Plaintiff thereupon
claimed alimony under the original decree as though she had "remained
unmarried." The Court held that while the New York annullment must
be given full faith and credit everywhere, it did not control "separable
legal rights." Therefore the alimony provision was to be construed in the
light of whether under Illinois law an annulled marriage does or does not
amount to a remarriage.
V. THE INSTITUTION AND ITS JUSTICES
The Work of the Institution
Once again, the total volume of the Court's work was light. This year
the number of cases was 89,171 as compared with 88 for 1950, 94 for 1949,
122 for 1948, and 119 for 1947. Before World War II, the docket usually
ran to 200 and more cases a year. So light a total load permitted extended
recesses during the term.
As last year, this decline of the docket was a product both of the rigidity of the grant of certiorari and of the decline of cases worth the Court's
deciding. The studies by Professor Harper and his collaborators go into
the subject so thoroughly that it is unnecessary to cover the same ground
here. 172 Suffice it to restate the conclusion of extensive demonstration in
previous articles, that the Court, in cutting its work-load down far below
the level it can be expected to handle, is not serving the purpose of the
Act of 1925 giving it discretionary jurisdiction. An unfortunate example
is the Dollar Steamship litigation, in which the government and the private parties involved finally split a financial burden which should have
fallen on either one or the other because the Supreme Court persistently
refused to decide the legal points involved. 73 Another is Rernington v.
170Sutton v. Leib, 342 U.S. 402 (1952).

17 On the uniform counting method used in these articles, see 1950 Term article, 19 Univ.
Chi. L. Rev. 165, 216 n. 215.
172Harper and Rosenthal, What the Supreme Court Did Not Do in the 1949 Term-An
Appraisal of Certiorari, 99 U. Pa. L. Rev. 293 (1950); Harper and Etherington, What the
Supreme Court Did Not Do in the 1950 Term, 100 U. Pa. L. Rev. 354 (1951).
173 For discussion, see 1950 Term article, op. cit. supra note 171, at 235. For continuation of
the Court's inaction, see Land v. Dollar, 72 S. Ct. 1069 (1952). The parties finally got tired
and settled after the Court adjourned for the summer, see N.Y. Times § 2, p. 33, col. 5 (June 13,
1952); 39 Newsweek, No. 35, at 70 (June 23, 1952).
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United States,17 4 where the Court, over two dissents, declined to review the
substantial procedural question of whether a grand jury indictment is
valid when the foreman of the grand jury is engaged in a financial venture
with the chief witness for the government and the profits depend materially on the outcome of the very case before the grand jury.
The declining certiorari jurisdiction can not be accounted for on the
ground of the extraordinary difficulty or importance of what is taken. As
a rough estimate, about twenty-five of the cases of the Term were of some
substantial importance, and another twenty-five were of some difficulty.
Several of the cases taken can only be described as piddling. Examples are
Desperv. Starved Rock Ferry Co., 7 ' a case unique on its facts, in which the
issue is whether a particular workman, doing unusual work on the Illinois
River, was a "seaman" and hence covered by the Jones Act; Bruner v.
United States,1 76 deciding whether a War Department civilian fire fighter

was an "employee" or an "officer" of the United States for Tucker Act
purposes; United States v. Kelly,'7 interpreting a long since obsolete pay
agreement covering holiday work at the Government Printing Office; and
Gardnerv. Panzama R. Co.,17 8 a tort case involving a unique problem in
laches and liability which could not arise again because of change of statutes. There may be some good reason why cases such as these should be
heard, but their existence negates any suggestion that the Court is reserving its energy solely for important public questions.
A related matter is the operation of the so-called Rule of Four. The Act
of 1925179 was passed on the assurance to Congress by the Court's representatives that certiorari would be granted when four, not five, Justices
voted for it. As has been pointed out in this series of articles before, that
promise would be nullified if, after four Justices voted to grant the petition, the remainder thereupon used their majority power to dismiss the
petition without deciding the case.
Justice Frankfurter continued this year to attempt to persuade his
brethren to adopt this dismissal practice. In United States v. Shannon, 8'
the Court granted certiorari and decided the case on its merits. Justice
Frankfurter declined to vote either way on the merits, arguing that the
petition should be dismissed. Justice Douglas, conceding that petitions
might be dismissed if improvidently granted, thought this privilege should
be restricted to those who have voted to grant the writ. Ee alluded to the
1 4342 U.S. 895 (1951).

1M342 U.S. 187 (1952).
17 343 U.S. 112 (1952).
1'7342 U.S. 193 (1952).

178342 U.S. 29 (1951).
17943 Stat. 938 (1925), 28 U.S.C.A. § 38 (1950).
180
342 U.S. 288 (1952).
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Rule of Four, saying "If four can grant and the opposing five dismiss,
then the four cannot get a decision of the case on the merits. The integrity
of the four-vote rule or certiorari would then be impaired."''1 The force of
this objection was apparent in United States v. Jordan.8 2 There, four Justices presumably having voted to grant certiorari, the Court heard argument and split four to four on the merits, Justice Frankfurter declining to
express any view since he thought the writ should be dismissed. Despite
the wish of four, the Court was thus rendered incapable of disposing of the
case except by affirming with an equally divided Court.
As for other details of its business management, the Court continued to
be extremely strict in barring the filing of briefs amicus.'1 3 Its rule seems
a peculiar one, since if the Court is going to reserve its energies for public
business of high seriousness, it might as well know what various segments
of the public think about the matters at hand.
Oral arguments before the Court continued, as they have for many
years past, to be less formal presentations of argument by counsel than
running discussion between the Bench and counsel. For example in the
American National Insurance case, with an hour on each side, the Court
interpolated 153 questions or observations during the argument of government counsel, and 84 during the argument of private counsel. Government
counsel uttered more than six consecutive sentences without interruption
only four times after his brief opening. The numerical distribution of the
237 interpolations during the 120 minutes of the two arguments was as
follows: The Chief Justice, 12; Justice Black, 30; Justice Reed, 69; Justice Frankfurter, 93; Justice Jackson, 26; Justice Burton, 7; and Justices
8 4
Douglas, Clark, and Minton none.
The distribution of majority opinions among the Justices is shown in
Table 3.
TABLE 3
DISTRIBUTION OF MAJORITY OPINIONS
Vimson ......... 9
Jackson ........ 9
Black .......... 11
Burton ......... 7
Reed .......... 7
Clark .......... 9
Frankfurter ..... 9
Minton ........ 10
Douglas ........ 11
Per curiam ..... 7
181

Ibid., at 298.

1-'342 U.S. 911 (1952).

113
On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 924 (1952), Justices Black and Frankfurter objecting
to the operation of the amicus rule.
14 NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952). In Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214
(1952), the total number of judicial interpolations was 166, divided as follows: The Chief
Justice, 58; Justice Reed, 52; Justice Jackson, 27; Justice Burton, 5; Justice Clark, 12; Justice
Minton, 12; Justice Douglas, none; and Justices Black and Frankfurter not participating.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 20

The extent to which the views of particular Justices have prevailed can
best be measured by concentrating on the most important of the decisions,
and for this purpose I have chosen, as objectively as possible on so subjective a matter, the two groups of cases which seem to me to have the most
important consequences to society. The first group consists of the seven
cases which seem the most significant of the year.185 The second group of
twenty cases are definitely less important, but are not routine. 88 The data
in Tables 4 and 5 are taken from these groups. Disqualifications give some
of the Justices fewer than a total of twenty-seven.
Justices most often in agreement were Chief Justice Vinson and Justices Reed and Burton. Had Justices Clark and Minton not been out of
TABLE 4
VOTING DISTRIBUTION IN MAJOR AND IMPORTANT CASES
MAJORITY VOTES

Major
Vinson ...........
6
Black .............
2
Reed ............. 5
Frankfurter .......
4
Douglas ..........
3
Jackson ...........
5
Burton ........... 6
Clark .............
6
Minton ...........
6

Important
17
13
15
13
12
17
16
14
10

Total
23
15
20
17
15
22
22
20
16

DISSENTnG VOTES

Major
1
5
2
3
4
2
1
0
1

Important
3
6
5
3
8
3
4
1
5

Total
4
11
7
6
12
5
5
1
6

so many cases, the incidence of agreement between them and the Chief
Justice would doubtless have been even higher.
The Work of the Individual Justices
The Chief Justice does not use his power of assignment, as some of his
predecessors have done, to take a great share of the big cases. This year,
1815
Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952); Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495
(1952); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580
(1952); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 72 S. Ct. 863 (1952); Zorach v. Clauson,
343 U.S. 306 (1952). (At the time this table was compiled, I did not adequately appreciate the
significance of Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952). I would now include it as a major
case. It would not materially affect any of the tabular data above, since it was unanimous but
for Justice Black's dissent; JPF.)
18
6 NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952); Brotherhood R.R. Trainmen
v. Howard, 72 S. Ct. 1022 (1952); Bindczyck v. Finucane, 342 U.S. 76 (1951); Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952); Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429
(1952); Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951); Jennings v. Illinois, 342 U.S. 104 (1951);
Kawakita v. United States, 72 S. Ct. 950 (1952); On Lee v. United States, 72 S. Ct. 967 (1952);
Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951); Morissette v. United States, 342
U.S. 246 (1952); Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415 (1952); United States v. New Wrinkle,
Inc., 342 U.S. 371 (1952); Pa. Water Power Co. v. FPC, 343 U.S. 414 (1952); Public Utilities
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of his nine thoroughly workmanlike majority opinions, none involved
earth shaking topics, and some were on distinctly minor themes. Two,
GeorgiaR. Co. v. Redwine,18 7 involving a claimed suit against a state and
an issue of federal versus state jurisdiction, and Memphis Steam Laundry
Cleaner v. Stone,'88 invalidating a discriminatory Mississippi license tax,
are particularly succinct and precise.
TABLE 5
PERCENTAGE IN MAJORITY,

MAJOR AND IMPORTANT CASES
Per Cent

V'mson ................
Black ..................
Reed ..................

85
58
70

Frankfurter ............

74

Douglas ...............
Jackson ................
Burton ................
Clark ...............
..
M inton ................

57
81
81
95
73

TABLE 6
AGREEMENTS AMONG JUSTICES IN MAJOR AND IMPORTANT CASES
Frank-

Vinson

V'ison ..... ..
Black .......
13
Reed ....... 20
Frankfurter. 14
Douglas .... 10
Jackson ..... 18
Burton .... 20
Clark ....... 19
Minton ..... 19

Black

Reed

furter

Douglas

Jackson

Burton

Clark

13

20
10

14
17
11

10
19
15
15

15
15
17
12
9

18
15
19
15
15

15
15
9
6

20
16
19
17
15
17

19
11
14
12
9
15
17

10
17
19
15
16
11
9

11
15
19
19
14
14

i7
15
12

17
13

Minton

19
9
14
9
6
12
13
15

15

The Chief Justice's handsomest opinion from an artistic standpoint
(this writer is not completely persuaded on the merits) may well be United
States v. Hayman. I89 It upholds the validity of Section 2255 of the Judicial
Code, 90 detailing the manner in which federal prisoners can collaterally
attack their convictions. This balanced and comprehensive opinion covers
the background of the statute, the circumstances of its drafting and its
application in the instant case. The bill was a product of the Judicial Conference in the period just before the Chief Justice came to preside over
187342

U.S. 299 (1952).

188342 U.S. 389 (1952).

189342

U.S. 205 (1952).

11 62 Stat. 967 (1948), as amended, 63 Stat. 105 (1949), 28 U.S.C.A. § 2253 (1950).
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that body, and one catches in the interstices of the opinion a sense of his
respect for that group.
The Chief Justice, scarcely an apostle of civil liberty, reaches most libertarian results in two cases. One was Jennings v. Illinois,9' discussed at
length above, finally breaking the Illinois procedural log jam in post conviction cases. The other was inStackv.Boyle,' 92 holding that persons charged
with political offenses have the same right to bail as anyone else. Regrettably he was unwilling to extend the same principle to aliens facing deportation. Whether in his massive dissent in the steel seizure case it was
sound strategy to claim so much more than was needed for the Executive
is arguable; assuming that it was, the dissent constitutes a forceful presentation particularly strong in its marshalling of the facts and in the prose
of its conclusion. Its oral delivery was unusually effective.
For Justice Black, this was a year of personal disaster. During it he lost
his wife, Josephine Foster Black, his constant companion, to whom he was
devoted. Despite this shattering loss, he concluded his 15th year on the
Bench with as many majority opinions as any other Justice.
In point of view, the Justice remained adamantly opposed to the repressionist spirit of the times. His outstanding expressions of this resistance were his dissent in the case upholding the Illinois group libel law,'93
in which he attacks the theory that the fundamentals of human liberty
are left by the Constitution to be disposed of by rational differences
among legislators; and his dissent in the alien bail case, 94 in which he hits
with precision, clarity, and force. For the very reason that his stand is so
straightforward, it is regrettable that the Justice has not yet done, in these
recent years, any comprehensive statement on freedom of speech. We
know his results, but not the full details of the logic by which he reaches
them; even the group libel case does not attempt this.
Some of his opinions are less satisfying. In Penn. Water & Power Co. v.
Fed. Power Comm.,'9' involving a possible conflict between the Commission's basic statute and the Sherman Act, it is not clear to this reader
whether the simple act of filing an agreement with the Commission does
or does not insulate that agreement from the Sherman Act. In Dice v.
Akron, etc. R. Co.,' an FELA case, it is most unclear whether the precedent case involved is overruled or distinguished, and if the latter, how.
191342 U.S. 104 (1951).
19 342 U.S. 1 (1951).

193 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
194 Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
1- 343 U.S. 414 (1952).

196 342 U.S. 359 (1952).
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Brannan v. Stark,'197 a dissent, involving the validity of payments to milk
co-operatives under the Agricultural Adjustment Act, is, most unusually
for Black, lengthy out of all proportion to its point. On the other hand, the
terse steel seizure opinion 98 is, from a structural standpoint, the best possible way out of a situation in which the Court was so greatly divided; and
the dissent in the release time case 9 makes orderly mincemeat of the
majority opinion. The dissent in the lawyers' contempt case2 ° is a flawless
presentation of its view.
One of the outstanding opinions of the year was Justice Reed's Ray v.
Blair,20 determining principally whether the Twelfth Amendment precludes Alabama's requirement that candidates for the Electoral College
pledge in advance to support their party's nominee. The case was decided
with unusual rapidity because of the imminence of an election there, and
either the briefs or the Justice's research or both were remarkably comprehensive, because the opinion is a very full, though compact, presentation
of this important matter. In other areas, the Justice wrote two majority
opinions 2'0 declining to expand in any way his bite noir, the McNabb rule.
The real mystery about Justice Reed is why, with his broad cultural
background and his deep personal humanity, he should be so nearly completely immune to the demands of human liberty. The discussion earlier
criticizes the merits of Justice Reed's five to four decision in the alien bail
case,20 3 under which it becomes routine practice in these United States for
an underling in the Department of Justice to tear an alien away from his
family and keep him in jail for years on nothing but a charge. Only our
Russian adversaries should be expected to treat human beings that way.
Yet if that result can be sustained under the Constitution, Justice Reed's
opinion makes the best case for it.
Justice Frankfurter's big opinion of the year upheld the Illinois group
libel law.20 4 His presentation here is strong. Equally strong, and devastat2
ing in its effect, is the dissent in the lawyers' contempt case. 11

197 342 U.S. 451 (1952).

198Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 72 S. Ct. 863 (1952).
19 9

Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).

201Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952).
301343 U.S. 214 (1952).

United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36 (1951); Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951).
v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
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The Justice's penchant for self-expression continued unabated. In the
steel seizure case" 6 he set a new record, with two concurrences (one a brief
note), and two appendices. The appendices in this case, which collect
statutes on seizure'and the instances of previous practice, are particularly
valuable and relevant; one may doubt whether the same may be said for
the quotations from twenty-three dictionaries appended to his movie
207
censorship concurrence.
The group libel case and the Justice's opinion in the stomach pump
forced confession case 08 leave the Court thoroughly committed to Justice
Frankfurter's natural law conception of due process, and to his theory
that laws restrictive of civil liberty must be upheld if there is any rational
basis for them. As the Justice puts his own credo in a dissent, we cannot
"approve legally what we disapprove morally,1 20 9 except for the rational
basis limitation. The acceptance of these concepts is a major victory for
the Justice; as was developed more fully above, he has now regained almost all the ground he lost when the first flag salute case was overruled.
In last year's article, Justice Douglas was described as "the batter who
couldn't strike out." This year there was one major miss. An admirer can
only veil his eyes at the release time opinion sl which, quite apart from the
result, is unfortunate in tone and totally fails even to discuss the critical
issue of why the petitioners were not allowed to offer proof on their claim
of coercion.
The Justice has the art of vigorous rhetorical writing without falling
into excess, either of verbiage or of vigor; an outstanding example is the
dissent in the Feinberg Law case.21 His dissent in the Communist deportation case212 is particularly stimulating in its call for a reconsideration of
the whole basis of the power of Congress over aliens, and his position is
cogently supported with legal as well as ethical considerations. Standard
Oil v. Peck 13 is an interesting revision of the law on the taxability of ships
by the state of their corporate domicile, and his opinions upholding the
Missouri statute giving time off for voting2 14 and on the treason of a Japanese-American who renounced his citizenship2 i are clear and persuasive.
2
16 Youngstown

Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 72 S. Ct. 863 (1952).

207Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 496 (1952).

v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
2'9
On Lee v. United States, 72 S. Ct. 967 (1952).
210Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
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Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
-3 342 U.S. 382 (1952).
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
24 Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952).
21 Kawakita v. United States, 72 S.Ct. 950 (1952).
1 Adler v.
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Experience may be making the Justice more critical of excessive administrative discretion than he might have been years ago. His opinion lamenting the limitless discretion of government contracting officers 216 has
been quoted above. In an ICC matter, dissenting alone, he said, "Unless
we make the requirements for administrative action strict and demanding,
expertise, the strength of modern government, can become a monster....
Absolute discretion, like corruption, marks the beginning of the end of
217
liberty."
Two of Justice Jackson's most important opinions this year have been
criticized above for that cardinal judicial sin, assuming the point in issue.
In the steel seizure case218 the Justice's opinion slides, in a phrase and a
footnote, past the vital question of whether the Taft-Hartley Act was
meant to preclude seizure and devotes pages to a question not argued by
anybody, namely whether the President can exercise the seizure power in
defiance of the express will of Congress. In the retroactive alien deportation law case, 219 a major question is whether it makes any difference that
the alien may have abandoned his political heresy almost twenty-five
years before this decision, and eleven years before the relevant statute was
passed. The justice expatiates on the comparative hardships of deportation and military service (a matter not remotely involved), but does not
discuss the possible legal consequences of genuine redemption by good
works at all.
This is, however, the only technical criticism of the Justice's opinions,
and it is not common to most of them. Even where he is of dubious relevance, his prose is superb and his thought stimulating. This is particularly
true in the steel seizure case. In the lawyers' contempt case,220 the Justice's
opinion makes an excellent case for its interpretation of Criminal Rule 42.
The opinion he most enjoyed writing is probably Morissette v. United
States,2 21 a wonderfully comprehensive and thoughtful discussion of the
place of intent in criminal law.
None of justice Burton's opinions this year are subject to even picayune
criticism. His most important is that upholding the occupation court sys-

tem in Germany.
21
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The discussion above suggests that it slips casually
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over its hardest point, but there was no alternative if the necessary result
was to be reached. His three tax opinions, each of which was of more than
casual difficulty and breadth, are of high standard in construction, clarity,
and utilization of relevant material. My personal choice as the best from
these standpoints, as well as interest, is Lilly v. Commissioner,2 23 on the
deductibility as business expense of opticians' rebates to eye doctors from
sales of glasses. His opinion on the Sherman Act violation of the newspaper publisher who refused the ads of those who also advertised with a radio
station in the same area 224 treats each of the several points involved with
due weight; one gets the impression from the fineness of the (relevant)
factual details that the Justice took special interest in disposing of this
problem from his home area in Ohio.
Justice Clark's opportunity of the year was the movie censorship case.",
To this reader at least, the resulting opinion is in a sense anticlimactic.
Students of the subject have been awaiting the overruling of the anachronistic Mutual Film case22 1 for so long that somehow the great day should
be introduced with a legal equivalent of the rolling of drums; one hoped
for an opinion in the grand style. Justice Clark treats the case as just another job in a work-a-day world. One must go to the concurrence to gratify a natural curiosity as to what the movie is about and how, in its whole
context, the problem arose; and where one might hope for serious analysis
of the place of movies in relation to speech and press, the result is very
nearly assumed. This may well be the best possible strategy for innovation; all that is meant to be suggested is that for all one's gratitude for
what is served, the taste is a little flat.
The Justice's position in the steel seizure case 22 7 is clear enough. The

enigma is why he took it. He was the only Justice to see any, much less
crucial, relevance in the seizure provision of the Selective Service Act of
1948, and with so many better reasons for going in either direction, it is
hard to understand why he chose this one. 2 8 Of his less colorful opinions,
perhaps the best is Brannanv. Stark,22 9 on payments to milk co-operatives
under the Agricultural Adjustment Act. The subject is difficult, the opin3S 343 U.S. 90 (1952); the others are Lykes v. United States, 343 U.S. 118 (1952), and
Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130 (1952).
4
2 Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
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ion well done and persuasive. Like the steel case, though of course in
lesser degree, it found him deciding against the administration. His lesser
opinions were all well done.
As has been noted, Justice Minton this year became the first Justice, in
the course of the six years this series of articles has been presented, to decide against the claimed civil liberty in every divided civil rights case in
which he participated. His position in these cases has the multiple merits
of brevity, clarity and candor. The Feinberg Law case, 3 discussed above
at length, is a good example. There is here no mealy-mouthed set of insignificant qualifications, no pretense of doing less than is being done.
Guilt by association? Justice Minton sees nothing wrong with showing
personal disqualification by checking the views of associates, and he says
so. Free speech for teachers? Justice Minton thinks that if they want free
speech so badly, they should get other jobs; and again he says so.
Some of the Justice's positions in this area are particularly hard to accept. He apparently believes that there can be no denial of due process in
giving a sentence no matter how captious a judge is, so long as he does
not exceed the statutory maximum ;231 Justice Minton makes no reservation at all for a duty to deliberate fairly before sentence is imposed. In one
right to counsel case, 232 the Court decided that the defendant was not
capable of defending himself adequately without a lawyer. Many years
earlier the defendant had been institutionalized as an imbecile. Justice
Minton, becoming so interested in showing that the defendant was not
really, in the technical sense, an imbecile, makes no allowance for the fact
that the man, at best, was not very bright.
Outside of the emotion-laden area of civil liberty, where if Justice Minton may be too extreme, his critics may be too harsh, there was a series of
excellent Minton opinions. His dissent in the most important Labor Board
case 233 of the year is very good, and a complex alien enemy property problem is analyzed with great skill in Uebersee Finanz-Korp. A.G. V.
McGrath23 4 His lone dissent in StandardOil Co. v. Peck,2 35 on the taxability

of vessels in inland waters in the state of their incorporation is not merely
more persuasive, but also better as a presentation of its view, than the
majority opinion.
2
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CONCLUSION

The 1951 Term was the last full judicial year in the Presidential terms
of Harry Truman. The Truman Court will thus outlast, and possibly long
outlast, the tenure of the President who appointed four of the Justices.
It is of course fitting and proper in a democracy that a judiciary, even
one exercising the power of judicial review, should take the complexion
of changing popular demands and changing administrations. No theorist
of democracy supposes that the judiciary should have become static with
John Marshall. The judicial function as the gyroscope of American policy
is to adjust the needs of society, but to adjust slowly.
The transition from the New Deal Court to the Fair Deal Court has
been a great change. In matters of economic policy, the machine runs in
the same general direction as did the Roosevelt Court, but such vigor,
militancy and spirit of innovation as the earlier Court had is gone. The
new static Sherman Act is the best example. In matters of civil rights, the
general direction has been reversed. The principal contribution of this
Court, whether for good or for evil, has been the introduction of a new era
of legislative and executive supremacy over individual liberty.
Justice Frankfurter, in the steel case, refers felicitously to the President as "a representative product of the sturdy democratic traditions of
the Mississippi Valley." As the time for the change in the appointing
power comes, one wonders whether this President, if he took the time
really to know what he had created, would want to do it again.

